

"DEVELOPMENT AS WEAPON: NEW DIRECTIONS IN OFFICIAL INDIAN POLICY IN BRAZIL"

by

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Introduction

On the 26th January 1981 one of the reigning Colonels in Brazil's National Indian Foundation (FUNAI), Colonel Zanoni Hausen, issued an instruction from his department, the DGPC (General Department of Community Development - now extinct) to three public servants hitherto undistinguished for any particular contribution to indigenous affairs in Brazil and with no particular qualifications for the task assigned to them. Their brief was to form a "Committee for the Identification of Criteria of Integration" and they were to present their results within ten days. The criteria, the document states, need no justification or explanation; "it is sufficient to list them in their principle groups: ethnic, sociological, economic, linguistic and so on".¹

This arbitrary, clumsy and superficial attempt to quantify the extent to which Indians are integrated into "national" society is based on the fundamentally fallacious interpretation of integration characteristic of nation-states dominated by national security ideology, whereby in order to become full nationals, and members of the State, ethnically distinct peoples have effectively to relinquish their specific cultural identity. The indigenist policies of Latin American governments - not withstanding their significant national differences - have as a common objective the integration of the Indian in a single nation-state, in which a pluri-ethnic society has no place. Batalla, citing Varese, calls these "false states", pointing out that the ruling classes of the post-colonial independent states elected themselves as the nation, (although in many countries representing the minority), to whose model all other peoples had to conform.²

The complex question of indianidade (indian-ness) will be dealt with later in this paper; suffice it now to introduce the nature of the Brazilian military regime's preoccupation with some identifiable, quantifiable point at which the Indian's accumulation of "integration criteria" (2 pairs of sunglasses, a transistor radio, wage labour on a neighbouring farm, readership of Zorro comics etc.) will enable the state to declare him no longer an Indian and thus no longer a threat to National Security, an obstacle to National Development and a conceptual problem for the limited reasoning powers of the Military Establishment.

1. "Instrucao Technica Executiva - FUNAI. Signed Cel. Zanoni Hausen
2. Guillermo Bonfil Batalla, "Utopia e Revolucion", Editorial Nueva Imagen 1981, p.13-14.

The situation is sufficiently absurd to be laughable were it not so serious. Under the specific structure of Brazilian Indian law, enshrined in the Statute of the Indian, the Indian defined as a minor is Ward of the State, and his land and security is to a certain extent protected by the Federal Constitution. FUNAI has for some years been attempting to modify the law in order to enable itself to relinquish its Guardianship of certain individual Indians or whole communities ex-officio. An "emancipated" (sic) Indian would become as privileged be held or imprisoned under the national Security laws as any Brazilian proving uncomfortable to the regime, by the very simple bureaucratic measure of changing his identity. An appropriate analogy is drawn by Manuela Carneiro da Cunha, president of the Pro-Indian Commission of Sao Paulo, of the Catholic brother who in order to satisfy his carnivorous desires when faced with a succulent steak for his Friday repast, declared "I baptise thee carp" and consumed it with a clear conscience.³

According to a recent press report, modifications to the law are already in process, and a document is in the hands of the Ministry of the Interior, (to which FUNAI is subordinate) which proposes individual ex-officio "emancipation" and new criteria for the criminal responsibility of the Indian. Should the project be approved, some 40,000 Indians - about 20% of the total Indian population of Brazil - could be "emancipated", including the Indians of the Rio Negro basin, the Terena of Mato Grosso, the Kaingang and Guarani of the southern states, the Makuxi, Taurepang and Wapixana of Roraima, and all the Indians of the East and Northeast.⁴

In the context of integration at all costs, imposed development projects play an important role, and we shall see in this paper how the recent modifications in the structure of FUNAI itself make of the agency's initial stumbling and ineffective community development programme a very effective weapon when it is carried out in conjunction with such unholy allies as State governments, reactionary religious missions, multinational companies, Federal agencies linked to the Ministry of Agriculture, and the World Bank. The overall picture that emerges at present is that since the military take-over of FUNAI eighteen months ago, the hard-line strategists have put together the most formidable anti-Indian machine yet devised in the history of Brazilian Indigenist policy, oiled by new formalised agreements with the National Security Council (CSN) and the National Information Service (SNI), and white-washed by a massive and sordid propaganda effort, using all the media. TV flashes between the banal soap-operas which dominate the Brazilian networks exploit the average viewers ignorance and ethnocentrism with such slogans as: "Make a little room for the Indian" - a masterpiece of cynicism which sanctions the integration plan and consequent appropriation of Indian lands, and aggravates racist reactions from the poorer sectors of the populations already or potentially in conflict with Indians over the scarce resources of land and labour. In this paper, after a

3. Manuela Carneiro da Cunha, "Critérios de Indianidade" ou Licoes da Antropologia, Folha de Sao Paulo 12.01.81.

4. "FUNAI vai sugerir a emancipacao individual", report in O Globo, Rio de Janeiro, 25th July 1981.

brief look at the history of official Indian policy up to 1967, we establish the general contemporary context of indigenous affairs in Brazil: the development of indigenist legislation since the creation of FUNAI IN 1967, the pattern of land conflict in the 1970's and early '80s and its implication for the modification of policy, and Indigenous resistance and the Pro-Indian movement. In this context we consider the role of FUNAI's community development projects and examine some specific cases, one being the expropriation of Tupiniquin territory by the London-based multinational company BAT (British American Tobacco) in exchange for "improvements" to the community.

Paternalism and Corruption: Government Indian Policy up to 1967.

Estimates of the population of Brazil in 1500 at the time of the Portuguese invasion vary considerably, and are a combination of rough calculations based on impressionistic and incomplete early chronicles and probable demographic density, and plain guesswork. The most conservative figure is just over one million, while higher estimates (Clastres, cited by Hemming) give a figure of 80-100 million for the indigenous population of the Americas - one-quarter of the world population in 1500.⁵ Hemming also cites Denevan's recent estimate for Amazonia alone as being between 4.8 and 3.6 million, but his own guess, following Steward, is that the population in 1500 for Brazil was in the region of 2.5 million.⁶ Hemming's contemporary estimate of 100,000 (1978) is however strongly contested by the results of an informal but thorough census carried out by the Indigenist Missionary Council (CIMI) in 1977-78 which put the figure at 210,000, including an estimated 30,000 detribalised Indians in cities and towns.⁷ The update of the census in 1980 pushed the figure up to 227,801.⁸ Hitherto uncontacted tribal groups of unknown size are known to exist and two of them are in the process of being "attracted" by FUNAI at the moment.

In any event, it is clear that over the past four and three-quarter centuries the indigenous population of Brazil has been reduced by at least 90% - in other words, has been practically exterminated. Government Indian policy has fluctuated throughout this time but has never been free of its basic mission of integration: even though some early legislation guaranteed the Indian peoples' rights over their territory, they were never given the status of sovereign peoples or nations, but were always seen as savages, noble or ignoble, to be civilised and incorporated into the (Portuguese) nation. The civilising task has been entrusted, as it partially still is, to many religious orders, the Jesuits predominating during the 16th and 17th centuries and first half of the 18th century, and thereafter to a lesser extent, the Capucins, or at various periods in this lamentable history, to government appointed agents or "directors of the Indians".

5. John Hemming, "Red Gold", Macmillan 1978, p.490.

6. John Hemming, op.cit. p.492.

7. "Porantim" Ano II No. 11 Sept. 1979.

8. "Porantim" Ano III No. 23 October 1980.

A brief view of the period up to the extinction of the SPI (Indian Protection Service) in 1967 reveals how Indian policies of the successive governments have merely explored the same limited variations, which given that the same basic premises, Colonialist in character, on which these policies are based have not changed, is hardly surprising.

In the early years of the Colonial period, during which time massacres and epidemics took a drastic toll of the coastal Tupi peoples, colonists and missionaries vied for control of the Indians. They were probably equally successful in destroying enormous numbers of people: in 1563, a single smallpox epidemic raged through the Jesuit missions in Bahia and wiped out 30,000 Indians.

Successive Portuguese monarchs vacillated in their response to the Colonists' lobby for the continuation of slavery and made feeble and temporary stabs at abolishing it, but at best merely in favour of the newly-founded and militant Society of Jesus, whose alternative form of slavery was the Christianising of the heathen in large newly-formed villages organised by the missionaries. In 1609, for example, Phillip II proclaimed the full freedom of the Indians, but he also decreed them to be legal minors - the status they still hold under contemporary legislation - and entrusted them to the Jesuits.

This legislation, which also proclaimed Indians to be the masters of their own territory, survived only two years, when under pressure from the colonists, slavery was re-introduced for prisoners taken in "just wars" or punitive expeditions. The excessively high mortality rate of Indian slaves, the opposition of the Jesuits to outright slavery, and the refusal of Indians to adapt to forced labour helped to justify the importation of African slaves from the west coast from the mid-16th century onwards. Both African and Indian slaves were used in warfare against free Indians, just as the Portuguese and French exploited traditional enmities amongst neighbouring peoples in their own battles for control of the coast.

By the end of the 16th century the coastal Indians had been dominated or exterminated, apart from a few small pockets of continuing resistance, and the Portuguese were pushing Westward to the Amazon basin and the interior of the south of Brazil, where the process continued. In the mid 17th century virtually unrestricted slavery was reintroduced by Joao IV, but the Jesuits also gained immense power, embarking on the notorious "descents", whereby Indians were contacted in their villages and drawn down to the towns, where the villages thus formed served as labour pools for the colonists, and captive subjects for Christianisation and civilisation.

This officially sanctioned policy is startlingly familiar: FUNAI's "attraction fronts" hunt out uncontacted Indians and then lure them to the posts or the roads which cut through their territory just as contemporary missions attract Indians to their stations. Conveniently "pacified" and "civilised", the Indians are available as easily exploitable "peons" or workers to the local labour market, and not uncommonly, despite the fact that vaccines are available in the 20th century, they are the victims of measles or whooping cough epidemics.

Towards the end of the 17th century the slaving expeditions which had been taking place in the Amazon basin were sanctioned by law, and individuals were

permitted to "descend" Indians for their own use. Slave traffic flourished. Once again policy from Portugal was vacillating and by 1750 a Jesuit father reckoned that in the past hundred years three million Indians had been "descended" from the Rio Negro basin alone.⁹

In 1755 the Marques de Pombal proclaimed the liberation of the Indians and confirmed their rights to their territory, and in 1759 the Jesuits were expelled from Portugal and her colonies. "Directors of the Indians" appointed by the governor replaced the missionaries in the mission villages, the Indians continued as minors and the civilising ideology was maintained. The "Diretorio" system collapsed under its own abuse and corruption 40 years later, much as did the ill-fated SPI (Indian Protection Service) founded during an upsurge of humanitarianism at the beginning of the 20th century.

At the beginning of the 19th century the pendulum swung back again with the penetration of the centre of Brazil: resistance by the Botocudo Indians to the invasion of their land resulted in a new law in 1801 authorising war against them and slavery of the captives. The Imperial and Regency periods carried on the same fluctuating policy, throughout the 19th century. In 1831 the 1801 law was revoked and Indians put under the same legal protection as orphans; in 1843 the Capuchins were invited to Brasil and distributed amongst the provinces, and in 1846 new legislation established the way Indians were to be instructed in the arts of civilisation and created once again a "diretorio" system with a director-general of the Indians in every province and a village director in every mission settlement.

By the beginning of the 20th century, press reports of the massacres of the Xokleng in Parana and Santa Catarina by professional bugreiros or Indian hunters, the war with the Botocudos, and the killing raids against the Kaingang Indians who were defending their territory against the construction of the Northwest railroad were beginning to disturb liberal consciences in the cities of the south. While public demands were made for the security of the colonists under attack from the Xokleng, members of scientific institutions and philanthropic organisations demanded that measures be taken to protect the Indians. When the then Director of the Museu Paulista, Hermann von Hering, proposed the extermination of hostile Indians who were impeding colonisation of the interior, the debate came to a head, and in 1910 the Indian Protection Service (SPI), under the direction of Candido Rondon, a young army officer who had successfully driven a telegraph line through Mato Grosso from Cuiaba to the Araguaia, maintaining peaceful relations with the Indians in the region and protecting them from the attacks of local colonist farmers, was founded.

Rondon was a militant positivist, and established the policy of the SPI on the basis of Auguste Comte's evolutionist humanism: given the protection and

9. John Hemming, op. cit. p.443.

assistance of the State, the Indian would progress at his own pace to a more advanced cultural level, eventually settling, cultivating the land, and becoming incorporated into the national society. Rondon's motto "Die if necessary: but never kill" characterised the romantic idealism of the early years of the SPI, which then set about its principle task of "pacifying" hostile Indians. In its first twenty years, The SPI "pacified" dozens of Indian peoples, setting up posts amongst them for protection and assistance.

At this point however the system broke down, and the SPI was unable to control the process it had begun. It had merely opened the way to the less benevolent representatives of the moving economic frontier, and the SPI post chiefs were powerless to confront state governments in the battle to protect and preserve Indian territory. In the 1950's the SPI was in the grips of a corrupt administration which not only gave in to economic pressure but itself profited from Indian lands. In 1967 the Minister of the Interior, General Albuquerque Lima, commissioned Attorney general Jader Figueiredo to investigate charges of corruption in the SPI. The 5,115 page Figueiredo report showed that the situation was much worse than had been imagined: there were cases of every kind of crime, abuse and fraud on the part of the SPI officials, and evidence of massacres of whole tribes using dynamite or deliberately introduced diseases against which the Indians had no immunity.

The SPI was made extinct amidst international outcry: but the Figueiredo report was never published, nor any of the accused criminals, some guilty of the deaths of hundreds of Indians, ever sentenced or punished. Between the earliest massacres and epidemics of the 16th century to the germ warfare and land-robbing of the 1950's, there is little to choose. At no time in Brazilian history did government policy genuinely favour the indigenous inhabitants, and with the creation of FUNAI from the ashes of the SPI (some of the old employees were re-employed by the new agency) at the time when Brazil was embarking on its conquest of the Amazon basin, the old processes of extermination were simply speeded up.

The Contemporary Conquest: Legislation and National Development in the 70's and 80's

In 1967 a new constitution was drawn up as Costa e Silva was appointed to the presidency, and FUNAI was formed. The new constitution maintained the colonialist tradition in policy, guaranteeing the Indians the constitutional right to permanent occupation of their territories and exclusive use of their natural resources, but denying them the right of collective ownership. The Indians lands are the inalienable property of the state, and the Constitution establishes that neither the State nor FUNAI itself are liable for compensation claims by invaders of Indian territory.

The old SPI had been shifted around from the Ministry of Agriculture to the Ministry of Labour, Industry and Commerce and back to the Ministry of Agriculture, reflecting the slightly differing biases in the integrationist planning. In 1934 the phantom of National Security raised its head about the

Indians inhabiting the national frontiers and the SPI constituted a "Department of Special Inspection of Frontiers" linked to the Ministry of War. ¹⁰ FUNAI was set up in 1967 within the Ministry of the Interior by the then Minister General Albuquerque Lima who promised that the SPI criminals would be punished and lands illegally sold or taken from the Indians would be returned to them.¹¹ Lima however did not last long.

Since the military coup of 1964, inflation had been controlled but not eradicated and mainly at the expense of the poor, whose buying power was reduced while income became further concentrated in the hands of the rich¹² Foreign investment was increasingly encouraged, and nationalists were purged along with leftists by the military. By the second half of 1967, the recessionist policies were reversed, and Brazil once again began to experience the rapid growth that became known as the "economic miracle". The miracle was of course one-sided, greatly benefiting the foreign investors and the rich, and was achieved only at the cost of civil liberties and centralisation of power (through several repressive "Institutional Acts") and a violent right-wing clamp-down at the end of 1968. Albuquerque Lima, ... favoured a certain degree of agrarian and social reform, was replaced in 1969 by Costa Cavalcanti, who quickly made clear his line on Indian policy: "We do not want a marginalised Indian, what we want is a producing Indian, one who is integrated into the process of national development".¹³

National development was by then in full swing: 1966 had seen the creation of SUDAM (Superintendency of Development in the Amazon) with its extremely attractive fiscal incentives to investment in the Amazon basin, and the launching of "Operation Amazonia" whereby 2 billion dollars would be invested in infrastructure and resource exploitation over the following 5 years. The creation of SUFRAMA (Superintendency of the Free Zone of Manaus) converted the city of Manaus, 1,000 miles up the Amazon from the sea and decadent since the rubber boom, into a tax-free port. In June 1970, PIN (National Integration Plan) was introduced, with a budget of 200 million cruzeiros, to fund the construction of roads and colonisation projects principally in Amazonia.

10. Luiz Beltrao, "O Indio, um Mito Brasileiro", Editora Vozes, 1977, p.23 "The head of the provisional government considering that the frontiers of Brazil are largely inhabited at present only by Indians, and that the Brazilian government does not have systematic and continuous inspection over them; and that the Indian is a precious element for his moral qualities, physical robustness and adaptability to climate, it is advantageous to make use of and educate (him) by suitable methods, calling him to our nationality before the border countries call him to theirs."
11. Shelton Davis, "Victims of the Miracle" Cambridge University Press 1977 p.13.
12. Paul Singer, "A Crise do Milagre" Ed. Paz e Terra, 1976 pp54-61.
13. Luiz Beltrao, op. cit. p26.

Immediately afterwards, President Medici launched the now-notorious "Transamazonica" plan, a monstrous highway system which was traced across the Brazilian map from the northeast coast to the Peruvian border just south of the Amazon river for 5,400 Km, and north to south from Santarem to Cuiaba in Mato Grosso, for 1670 Km, in a "huge symbolic cross representing the domination of the world's latest great unviolated forested land".¹⁴

The Northern Perimeter highway and several link roads were to complete the 15,000 Km system, launched as Medici's response to the plight of the thousands of northeastern peasants rendered homeless by the worst drought in decades. "Land without people for people without land" justified a vast colonisation scheme for the relocation of 5,000,000 people from the northeast and overpopulated southern states along the 100-km deep stretches of land along either side of the highway, which was based on the colonialist view of an empty Amazonia and the avoidance of the only - but politically dangerous - solution to the problems of the Northeast: genuine agrarian reform.¹⁵

During the construction of the Transamazon highway, the territories of dozens of Indian people were invaded; not only by the road itself, but by the influx of colonist farmers spontaneously or through colonisation schemes. FUNAI's contact and "pacification" efforts were disastrous in every sense, and some peoples were to all effects exterminated: the Kararao were reduced from several hundreds to a mere handful, the Kreen-Akrore to half their original numbers, the Parakana decimated by flu and VD transmitted by the FUNAI employees on the "Attraction fronts". In May 1972, Antonio Cotrim Soares, one of FUNAI's most dedicated Indian agents working along the Transamazon highway resigned, and in a much publicised interview said he was "tired of being a grave-digger for the Indian". The case of the Parakana was, he revealed, general along the Transamazon pacification front. Cotrim declared that he did not intend to contribute to the enrichment of economic groups at the cost of the extinction of Indian peoples, and that as long as FUNAI remained within the Ministry of the Interior it would be impossible to protect them.¹⁶

The violence of the first invasion of Brazil was equalled in the new penetration of the Amazon, and the resistance of some of the Indian peoples no less determined and desperate. The Waimiri and Atoari Indians in Amazonas and Roraima resisted contact over the centuries, suffering punitive massacres and retaliating where they could. They inhabit the forests just north of the city of Manaus, and a myth grew up about their fierceness, a myth fostered by successive generations of traders, missionaries and government officials who tried unsuccessfully to subjugate them. Finally the 1970's brought the

14. Anna Presland, "Reconquest: An account of the contemporary fight for survival of the Amerindian peoples of Brazil" Survival International Review, Spring 1979, p.20.

15. Anna Presland, op. cit. p.20.

16. Anna Presland, op. cit. p.24.

construction of the BR-174 from Manaus northwards to Boa Vista, and the Waimiri and Atroari resisted this new offensive with renewed desperation. The army's Sixth Engineering and Construction Battalion, which built the road, had orders to shoot on sight, and there is documentary and eye-witness evidence that the army used bombs and machine-gun fire in vicious attacks on the Indians.¹⁷

From the beginning of the 1970's and the establishment of significant tax incentives, Brazil with its cheap labour force became an increasingly attractive base for industrial production for multi-national companies. As exportation grew, so Brazil was in a better position to borrow, and her foreign debt quadrupled from 4.4 billion dollars in 1969 to 17.3 billion in 1974. The opening of the Brazilian economy to foreign investment and markets resulted in an expansion of activity of multinational companies in all sectors of the economy, and in Brazil's consequent dependence on them both financially and technically.¹⁸

The influx of foreign capital and huge mining and agribusiness projects had obvious implications for the Indians. The World Bank made the largest road-building loan in its own history for the Transamazon highway, US Steel, Rio Tinto Zinc, ALCOA, Hanna Mining invested in the mineral sector, and swift-Armour, Volkswagen, Liquegas set up enormous cattle ranches in the north and in Mato Grosso - to mention only a few. All of these investments involved the invasion of Indian lands, with the concomitant loss of life and livelihoods to the Indians.¹⁹

British American Tobacco (BAT) through its subsidiary, Souza Cruz, deforested and is still deforesting 76,000 ha. along the coast of the state of Espirito Santo in the traditional territory of the Tupiniquim Indians, and replanting with eucalyptus. The enormous cellulose mill now dominates the devastated landscape and has polluted the waters along the coastline to the extent that all the region's marine life, which was the basis of the Tupiniquim diet, has been destroyed.

In this context of capitalist expansion and developmentalist ideology, with FUNAI subordinate to the principle agent of development expansion, the Ministry of the Interior, the body of legislation pertaining of Indian policy, the Statute of the Indian, was drawn up. Having taken over three years to get through Congress and gain approval by the new president, Emilio Garrastazu Medici, it emerged in 1973 a masterpiece of internal contradictions and ambiguities. The original bill suffered 44 modifications and all the sections referring to direct assistance to Indigenous communities from religious or philanthropic institutions were vetoed, giving FUNAI exclusive control of Indian societies and the relations between them and the "national" society.

17. Anna Presland, "Waimiri-Atroari - the Massacres behind the Myth" in ARC Bulletin, December 1979, pp4-5.

18. Paul Singer op. cit. pp.114-116.

19. Anna Presland, SI Review (op. cit.) pp.21-23.

Another key section vetoed paragraph 2 of Article 18, prohibited third persons to contract with Indians for the exploitation of their resources. This left the necessary loophole for the leasing of resources of Indian lands, and directly contravenes article 198 of the Constitution.

The loophole is used to its full effect in Title IV, concerning the income of the Indian estate. Article 42 places the administration of the estate in the hands of FUNAI, and article 43 reads: "the indigenous income" or Renda Indigena will preferably be applied in lucrative activities or in programmes to assistance to the Indian". The whole deal is clinched by article 45 which gives the Minister of the Interior the rights to the subsoil in Indian territories, including the powers to allow third parties to research and exploit the mineral resources. Provisions for compensation to the Indian are left very vague, it being merely stated that such income would form part of the "renda indigena" administered by FUNAI. The APS (Aborigenes Protection Society) team who visited Brazil in 1972 at the invitation of the Brazilian government, calls the renda indigena a "concealed tax" (P.148) and observed in their report "it seems dangerous for an Indian protection service to have a financial stake in the profitability of its charges' output" pointing out that part of the Renda supports FUNAI centrally and its projects in other areas.²⁰

The Statute, in its articles 2(v), 17 and 22 reiterate article 198 of the Constitution, and article 25 states that the recognition of the Indian' rights to permanent occupation "will be independent of their demarcation, and will be assured by the federal organ of assistance to the Indian, according to the contemporary situation and historical consensus with respect to the antiquity of the occupation..." In article 20, however, provision is made for the complete violation of these rights: under any one of six stipulated conditions, Indians can be removed temporarily or permanently, to any other area. These include 4 all-embracing conditions:

1. To impose National Security
2. To carry out public works of interest to national development
3. To repress disorder on a large scale
4. To exploit the riches of the subsoil of relevant interest to national security and development.

Thus the guarantees of the Constitution - which themselves leave much to be desired - are undermined by the Law no. 6001 which set up the Statute of the Indian. This particular judicial anomaly has never really been adequately challenged, although Dalmo Dallari, lawyer of the Justice and Peace Commission of Sao Paulo, states clearly that: "There is no right which contradicts the Constitution.... in spite of all the variations in Portuguese and Brazilian legislation relative to the lands occupied by the Indians, the resolutions of the current Constitution prevail, against which no-one may allege acquired rights".²¹

20. APS Report "Tribes of the Amazon Basin in Brazil 1972" Charles Knight & Co. Ltd. 1973, p.22.

21. Dalmo Dallari, in "A Questao da Terra", Global Editora 1979, p.71.

However while this anomalous legal situation allows - and even sanctions the invasion, appropriation and exploitation of Indian territory, on a whole host of pretexts, the question of the legal responsibility of the State as Guardian still remains, and as the Indians become increasingly aware of their political situation and their legal rights and make public their dissatisfaction, so the State Guardian's position becomes more and more uncomfortable. So to complete the work of both the national development front and FUNAI's community development projects, in the destruction of native communities, it becomes necessary and urgent for FUNAI to find a way legally to abrogate its role as Guardian: in order to do this it has to change the identity of its wards - baptise them carp.

In 1978 the Minister of the Interior, Rangel Reis, tried to do just that, through the "Emancipation Decree" sent to the President in October of that year, whereby it was proposed that FUNAI emancipate individuals and communities ex-officio and make it possible for "emancipated" Indians to own their land. On the surface, this last provision does not seem unreasonable, but in the context of the land grilagem (illegal appropriation of land by force) so prevalent in Brazil's interior, the power of large economic groups and the connivance of the Brazilian military government, it was clear that this was merely a ruse to "emancipate" the Indians' land.

In the words of an Indian leader who spoke at a huge protest meeting in Sao Paulo in November 1978: "The struggle for emancipation will be carried out neither by the government nor the Minister of the Interior nor by anyone else. This emancipation will be carried out by ourselves, we the Indians.... This emancipation is a lethal weapon which will simply take from us all chance and every weapon we have to protest the infringement of our rights... If this emancipation is approved, we, the more politically aware Indians, will also be marked along with those who are called subversive."²²

A very effective national and international campaign waged throughout 1978 against the "Rangel Reis Decree" forced the Minister to have it shelved: things quietened down, but it was only a matter of time before the question came up again in another guise. One of the positive effects of the anti-emancipation campaign however was the extraordinary mobilisation of Indian supporters all over the country, many of whom subsequently formed permanent Indian support groups: the campaign in fact became a movement, which subsequently mobilised several congressmen to set up a permanent lobby in Congress in favour of the Indian. The pro-Indian lobby, now formed of this movement and the "theology of liberation" - inspired indigenist wing of the CNBB (National Conference of Brazilian Bishops) known as CIMI (Indigenist Missionary Council), has now gained considerable strength, also giving great support to the Indian leaders who come to Brasilia to present their petitions personally to the government.

22. Daniel Cabixi, "A Questao da Emancipacao", Global Editora 1979, p.71.

During 1979 FUNAI's image improved somewhat through the efforts of the president appointed by the Figueiredo administration, Ademar Ribeiro da Silva, a civil engineer and ex-president of the National Highways department (DNER) during the Medici government, when Mario Andreazza, now Minister of the Interior, was Minister of Transport. Remembering the terrible days of the Transamazon highway pacifications, it seemed like a nightmarish combination, but Ademar surprised his critics and tackled some of the most serious problems faced by FUNAI: the agency's internal corruption, and the increasing number of land conflicts caused by the failure of the previous administration to demarcate indigenous territory. He removed some of the most corrupt funcionarios within FUNAI, but in doing so alienated several powerful figures within the agency and the Ministry of the Interior to whom these lesser funcionarios were connected.

In the attempt to demarcate indigenous territories, for which he secured reasonable funds, he ran up against regional, national and international economic interests supported by State governments, notably in Roraima, Rondonia, Sergipe and Mato Grosso. Throughout this time, Andreazza gave verbal support to FUNAI's demarcation efforts, claiming that indigenous affairs were a priority of his Ministry. However, when pressure on FUNAI increased, culminating in a document from the Associação de Empresários de Mato Grosso (Association of Businessmen of Mato Grosso) and a letter sent to the President of Brazil by the Governor of Mato Grosso, supported by Senators and Deputies, which protested against the demarcation of Indian lands in the State, Andreazza bowed to the economic lobby, and on November 1st, da Silva's successor was appointed.

Significantly the new appointment was military, and Colonel Joao Carlos Nobre da Veiga had previously been co-ordinator of the division of Security and Information of DOCEGEO, subsidiary of the State-owned company Cia. Vale do Rio Doce (CVRD), which had invaded the territory of the Tupiniquim and Yanomami Indians - in the latter case the technicians of DOCEGEO were removed from the Yanomami cassiterite reserves at Surucucu in August 1979 by da Silva. Da Veiga lost no time in making his militaristic and developmentalist policies clear, declaring that his purpose would be to find the "common denominator" between the interests of economic groups proposing exploitation of Indian resources, and the Indian communities. By mid-1980, da Veiga had filled FUNAI with military appointments, and sacked over 30 civilian employees, including some of the agency's most experienced and dedicated indigenists and anthropologists. Close agreements were contracted later in the year with, the CSN (National Security Council) SNI (National Intelligence Service) and the army (which was to be entrusted with demarcation of Indian territory), and the decentralisation plan of FUNAI, announced at the end of 1979, was put into effect.

The restructuring of FUNAI through decentralisation had been in the pipeline for some time, and on the surface seems a salutary measure, when the geographically scattered nature of the distribution of the Indian population through all but two states of Brazil demands a more effective regional presence and greater autonomy of the regional delegacies, especially to mobilise assistance in cases of emergency. Essentially, the project involves agreements made between FUNAI, through its regional delegacies, and the State governments, whereby the Indians "are situated as people belonging to the states" in the words of Minister Andreazza,²³ and the State governments become partly responsible for the design and funding of programmes of community development in the areas of health, education and technical assistance.

There is no doubt about the political rationale for this "structural" change: FUNAI has always been something of an anomaly in the Ministry of the Interior, as the interests of its wards are inevitably threatened by the Ministry's policies. The pressures of State governments - which in fact precipitated the downfall of Ademar da Silva - have never been greater than at present, directly on the Indians and on FUNAI itself, in the form of accusations that the agency is impeding development, setting up its own latifundios through the creation of Indian reserves, instigating conflict between Indians and posseiros (landless peasants or squatter farmers) and ranchers, and so on. It evidently became necessary to bring FUNAI back squarely into the political machine: this was done with its militarisation under da Viegas and its contracts with the CSN and SNI. Its now openly affirmed role of conciliation of economic interests with Indian interests has substituted its original role of protection agency, and this new role has been now institutionalised by the formally established mechanism for the definition and application of (integrationist) policy in conjunction with state governments, clearly compromised with large economic groups and in certain cases themselves the agents of grilagem of Indian land.

The measure appears even more far-reaching when seen in conjunction with the apparent conquests of abertura, the government "redemocratisation" plan: direct elections for State governors in 1982, and token stabs at agrarian reform. As Indian lands through FUNAI's decentralisation and integration policies move into State government control, they become booty in regional party political battles, and crucial for the rural electoral base of the government party, the PDS. The manipulation of false wars between Indians and landless peasants, traditionally the sector of the population used as the vanguard for economic expansion into indigenous territory, can be expected to increase as the regime secures its social base. As production appears to intensify on Indian lands through imposed government economic projects, the old argument that Indians have too much land can also be brought back into play, and the way is clear for "agrarian reform" to take place, not at the expense of the latifundio, but of Indian community land.

23. Folha de Sao Paulo, 23.11.1979.

It is clear that for the first time, the military regime has managed to make a useful agency out of FUNAI, and at last the developmentalist policies of the government can be properly worked out in Indian territory without entering into conflict with regional interests. The structure is perfectly set up for integration-through-development on Brazil's crude capitalist model, and is now complemented by FUNAI's recent announcement (cited in the introduction to this paper) that ex-officio emancipation is finally on its way to becoming law.

Integration through Disintegration: the real purpose of Development

It should be this time have become clear that "community development" carried out by the Brazilian government in Indian areas is merely one of the later tactics in the centuries-old effort to deny these peoples' sovereignty in their own land, to destroy them physically and culturally, and effectively make them disappear. Yet in spite of the devastating demographic reductions suffered by the Indians, and the fact that many entire Indian nations have disappeared altogether (Ribeiro estimates that 87 nations disappeared between 1900 and 1957)²⁴ the government is having to perform the most elaborate legal and structural acrobatics to get rid of the remaining Indians, who now make up only 0.2% of Brazil's 121,000,000 population. The Indian population is at present expanding in Brazil, and as official repressive measures are refined and the land invasions continue, so indigenous resistance grows.

The 1980's so far have seen the emergence of two indigenous organisations, which are struggling to broaden their full regional bases, in the face of threats from the government and the refusal of FUNAI to recognise the legality of the organisations. Over the past two years, several active Indian leaders have been assassinated, others intimidated by the colonels within FUNAI, and others threatened with death by representatives of regional or local economic groups. National and regional indigenous assemblies are held in various parts of the country with the logistic support of the Catholic church's indigenist wing, CIMI, in spite of FUNAI's efforts to prevent Indians from leaving their villages in order to attend these meetings. The meetings are frequently infiltrated, and Indians harrassed on their return to their villages.

Land conflicts are exploding all over the country, with deaths on both sides, as FUNAI deliberately delays demarcation of Indian territories. Towards the end of 1980, the Txukarramae of the Xingu and the Kayapo-Gorotire in Para resorted to armed attacks of farms established in their territories, killing farm-hands, women and children. In Mato Grosso, the Xavante Indians are in a continual state of war with local ranchers and with FUNAI over the demarcation of their land, the lands of the Karaja and the Kadieu, the Surui and the Nambikwara are completely occupied by cattle and farmers, and the Yanomami, whose land has not been demarcated in spite of repeated conflicts and epidemics in the area, are suffering deaths from flu and measles brought in by placer-miners invading their territory.

24. Darcy Ribeiro, "Os Indios e a Civilizacao", Ed. Vozes 1977. p.434.

In this context, the implanting of community development projects amounts to a double offensive: not only are the projects almost without exception dangerous and destructive in themselves, but they divert funds and attention from the single most important and fundamental task of FUNAI - the demarcation of Indian lands. One of the conclusions of the 7th Assembly of CIMI was that "the economic projects which are being implanted in indigenous areas, by the capitalist ideology on which they are based, mortally wound the economic and cultural structure of tribal groups. Such projects are even more pernicious, for they not only lead to the reduction of the land of the indigenous nations, fundamental to the future of these people, through corrupting pay-offs to tribal leaders, to the detriment of the community, but are inevitable failures in economic terms."²⁵

The newspapers are at present full of official press releases of the large amounts of money liberated by FUNAI for agricultural assistance to Indian communities. "FUNAI applies 176 million cruzeiros in Indigenous Communities"²⁶ heads an article which informs that 57 community development projects have been approved, and cites the distribution of the resources in areas principally in the south of the country - exactly in those regions where the indigenous population occupies productive land, has had longest contact with the "national" society, and is certainly in the running for "emancipation". By far the major part of the money is destined to the Xavante communities in Barra do Garças in Mato Grosso - a sum of 57 million cruzeiros (compared with 50 million cruzeiros to be distributed amongst 18 FUNAI posts in other areas, and the 7 posts in Rio Grande do Sul which will receive a total of 9.9 million cruzeiros.

The article continues "the projects, according to the President Joao Carlos Nobre da Veiga, are destined to develop agriculture and cattle-farming in the indigenous communities following the directives of the Minister Mario Andreazza, of the Interior. They are intended also to show the Indians that they have the wherewithal to compete equally with the surrounding population. An example was the rice production of the Xavante Indians, who harvested 2,838 tons in 1980/1981."²⁷

The concentration of resources in the "Projeto Xavante", which has been running for several years now, and always with large amounts of money from FUNAI, exemplifies the development/integration/leadership - corruption tactics of the government. The Xavante have in the past four or five years become a significant force on the indigenous scene. First contacted in the 1940's, the Xavante were subjected to land invasion by cattle farmers through the 1950's and 1960's until in the early 1970's they lost patience with official promises of land demarcation and removal of invaders and began to attack the farms and kill the cattle.

25. "Diario da Manha", Góiania, 2nd July 1981.

26. approximately US \$1,760,000

27. Article in Gazeta das Noticias, Rio de Janeiro, 18th July 1981.

FUNAI then began to create reserves for the Xavante, but demarcation was not effected, the invasions continued and the Xavante not only maintained armed resistance to the cattle ranchers but began to go in large groups to Brasilia, challenging the President of FUNAI in his offices. In a much publicised Xavante visit to Brasilia last year, a Xavante chief was only just prevented by his fellow-tribesmen from hurling the president of FUNAI out of the window of his 8th story office. The most well-known of all Brazil's Indian leaders, Mario Juruna, is a Xavante Indian, and he has considerable following amongst other Indian peoples.

The Xavantes clearly represent a serious problem for the government, not only in themselves, but for the example of resistance they offer to other Indian groups, and for the public attention they command and the constant political lobbying they engage in in Brasilia. Hence the enormous amounts of money being poured into the communities, and the many cases of personal gifts made by the President to Xavante leaders, with the express request to them to keep quiet.

More recently however, direct threat and intimidation has been used. Mario Juruna, who gained a passport last year to attend the IV Russel Tribunal on Indian Rights through a court ruling overriding FUNAI, is one of the first candidates for ex-officio emancipation, and thus for imprisonment if he steps too far out of line. Joao Evangelista Babatire, another Xavante leader, was recently intimidated during a long meeting in Brasilia with FUNAI's gang of colonels: the Xavante leader was heard by the sub-committee on Indian affairs (set up within the Congressional Committee of the Interior) and from one day to the next had changed his tune so radically, reducing his land claim and dropping his threats that his people would attack unless satisfied, that observers in Brasilia concluded that he had been heavily intimidated by FUNAI during his meeting, on the afternoon of the first day.²⁸

O Globo reported the incident thus: "The Xavantes of the village of Dom Bosco invaded and looted, last month, three ranches situated in the north of the reserve of Sangradouro, in the area claimed by them. During a meeting in Brasilia with Colonel Nobre da Veiga, at the beginning of the month, the chief Joao Evangelista Babatire retracted his land demands and accepted FUNAI's counter offer of a tractor and a loan from the Bank of Brasil for the development of agriculture.... Colonel da Veiga met with the leaders of the villages Dom Bosco and Sangradouro, in the reserve of Sangradouro, and told them that "the government and the Indians would work together for the benefit of both parties". He added that "the government is very pleased that the Xavantes of Mato Grosso have produced 51,000 sacks of rice this year, for this is a sign that the Indians are ready to compete with the farmers in the market".²⁹

28. The writer of this paper was present at the hearing on June 9th 1981.

29. O Globo, Rio de Janeiro, 26th July 1981.

The familiar role of the traditional Catholic missions, as recounted at the beginning of this paper, is evident in this particular incident. The report continues: "When Colonel Nobre da Veiga arrived in the two villages, the Indians hoisted the Brazilian flag and sang the National Anthem. In the meeting room, there was another flag, which led the President to affirm that the patriotic spirit is transmitted by the religious missions, which is work the government could not fail to recognise.³⁰ He observed that the missions already have the infrastructure set up in the villages of Mato Grosso, in the Rio Negro Valley and other regions, offering the government a more economic way of helping the Indian. In his opinion, the missions are so organised that within a few years they will be able to transform the villages into tourist attractions, thus presenting the customs and habits of the Indians to society".³¹

It is beyond the scope of this paper to go into detailed analysis of the projects typically implanted by FUNAI, but it is true to say that almost without exception they are designed and planned in the headquarters of FUNAI in Brasilia without any consultation with the Indians involved, and following the directives of the Ministry of the Interior. As Silvio Coelho dos Santos points out, the income from large economic projects in the South of Brazil is considerable and is put entirely at the disposal of FUNAI which theoretically distributes it to other Indian communities for health and education work through the renda indigena, but in fact it contributes to the maintenance of the bureaucrats who, established in Brasilia, determine the continuity of the projects which thus continue to support them...³²

The structure of the economic projects interfere in every way with indigenous social organisation and values, having as one of their objectives the introduction of capitalist relations of production which foster the dissolution of the community, undermining the collective organisational structures and favouring the emergence of individualism. Traditional political organisation is over-ridden by the appointment and financial support of imposed "chiefs" who by their dependence on FUNAI become corruptible agents of division within the group, and agents of stimulation of the new economic system.

The 1977 Congressional Commission of Enquiry into the question of Indian land concluded that the projects implanted by FUNAI and MINTER (the Ministry of the Interior) had as their principal objective the acceleration of the integration process and the "complete submission of the indigenous societies to the

30. The missionaries in question are the Salesians, at present under considerable attack for their repressive regime amongst the Tucanoan Indians of the Rio Negro Valley, widely denounced within Brazil and at the IV Russell Tribunal on Indian Rights in Rotterdam in November 1980, by the Tokana Indian, Alvaro Sampaio.

31. O Globo, cited above.

32. Silvio Coelho dos Santos, "Educação e Sociedades Tribais", Ed. Movimento 1978, pp.46-51.

national society", pointing out that the projects did not take into account the economic and political specificities of the Indians. The projects, the Commission stated "in fact constitute a replica of a typical capitalist model of economic exploitation which is being imposed on those societies. This, in that they involve only the remuneration of the factors of production - land and work - ceded by the community as titular to the Indigenous Patrimony. These practices interfere in every way with the specific socio-economic system of the groups, involving disastrous alterations principally in the system of traditional division of labour, the necessary time and rhythm of work, forms of the distribution and the circulation of goods, preventing, in fact, that the indigenous economy from functioning and developing according to the internal regulations and concepts governing lands use".³³

CIMI, in its recent annual Assembly (22nd-26th July 1981), denounced the new political tactics of FUNAI as being tactics of "shock and terror", characterised by repeated acts of corruption of indigenous leadership, a premeditated strategy of economic projects, which structurally destroy the social organisation of communities by acts of de facto emancipation, and by a growing repression of Indians missionaries and allies of the Indian cause".³⁴

The spokesman of the Assembly, D. Quirino Schmitz, Archbishop of Teofilo Otoni, affirmed that "FUNAI has discovered a much subtler and much crueller formula, but at the same time better accepted by national and international public opinion, as it creates the false impression that it is promoting the well-being of indigenous communities". The consequences of this new form of action by FUNAI, according to the denunciations made by CIMI, "are far more damaging, because through the bribery and corruption of leaders, the Indians become divided and thus lose their strength". The economic projects of FUNAI, according to CIMI, have also the purpose of incorporating the Indian into the social system of the white, introducing technologies to which the indigenous groups are not accustomed".³⁵

TWO CASES : the role of the World Bank and British American Tobacco.

As we have seen earlier in this paper, foreign investment has fundamentally affected the situation of the Indians in Brazil particularly since the 1960's and 1970's. Now to conclude this paper, we look briefly at two cases of the direct involvement of large international organisations in the appropriation of Indian land and the buying-off of the Indians with the collaboration of FUNAI, through projects of development assistance.

The first case involves the World Bank and the Projeto Polonoroeste, a project which aims to asphalt the dirt road running from Cuiaba in Mato Grosso to Porto

33. CPI of the Indian, 1977, p.32.

34. Final Document of 4th Assembly of CIMI quoted in Folha de Sao Paulo 27th July 1981.

35. Folha de Sao Paulo, 25th July 1981.

Velho in Rondonia, the BR-364, and set up the infrastructure for colonisation and economic exploitation of the region. The World Bank is part-funder of the project, which will affect more than 25 Indigenous peoples, totalling some 8,000 Indians, some of whom have had very little contact with "white" society.

The people most drastically and immediately affected will be the Nambikwara, who traditionally inhabited some 50,000 square kilometres in northwestern Mato Grosso and Rondonia. Their population was reduced from an estimated 20,000 at the beginning of the century to just over 600 today, and the major and most fertile part of their territory, the Guapore Valley, has been invaded by cattle ranchers. By 1970-71 FUNAI had illegally issued permits to 22 large ranching corporations, some connected to the then Minister of the Interior, in the Guapore, having in 1968 created a reserve for the Nambikwara in the dry savannah on the other side of the BR-364, where only 10% of the entire Nambikwara population lived. The Nambikwara were forcibly transferred to the reserve, but starvation forced them quickly to return: in the now-occupied valley, weak and hungry, they soon picked up white man's diseases such as measles, and one epidemic wiped out the entire Nambikwara population under 15. The area became known as Brazil's "Biafra".

FUNAI transferred them to the savannah reserve for the second time, but complete lack of the minimum conditions for subsistence drove them back to the valley, where by now the ranchers were using lethal defoliants banned in all other countries and compared with Agent Orange used in the Vietnam war, which affected the Nambikwara's crops and polluted their drinking water. FUNAI has now created a few small separate reserves in the valley, but no attempt has been made to remove the illegally entrenched ranchers.

The BR-364 ran along the edge of the escarpment to the east of the valley, but pressure from the ranchers in the Valley at the time the Polonoreste project was being drawn up led to the rerouting of the road through the middle of the valley, hence through several Nambikwara villages and reserves. The World Bank, in response to an international campaign, made the loan conditional on the setting up of a project of assistance and protection to the Indians who would be affected by the road, but did not refuse to fund the new trajectory of the road. FUNAI drew up a project in its usual style, and in spite of heavy criticism of it by an anthropologist contracted to evaluate the project for the Bank, the Brazilian government claims that the loan has already gone through, and recent reports in Brazilian newspapers claim that the Bank has liberated 50 million cruzeiros for the building of 12 new "vigilance posts" along the BRZ-364.³⁶

A slightly later report however contradicted these, and announced that the 50 million cruzeiros were part of the PIN funding for the project, and although the Bank was funding the asphaltting of the road, it had not liberated any funds

36. O Globo, Rio de Janeiro, 20th June 1981, Diario Popular, Sao Paulo, 20th June 1981, O Dia, Rio de Janeiro, 22nd June 1981, and A Gazeta, Vitoria, 22nd June 1981.

for FUNAI. Whatever the real case, the Bank has approved the project, which includes health, education, demarcation, administration, agriculture and cattle-raising. It should be pointed out at this stage that the Nambikwara are semi-nomadic hunter-gatherers, living in small bands with a minimum of material culture and practicing a limited amount of agriculture. Thus, despite the lip-service paid by the Bank to social programmes and internal pressure applied by its few more enlightened employees, it cannot escape the fact that funding the Polonoroeste project within the present political and economic regime in Brazil could lead to the destruction of not only of the Nambikwara, but of all the Indian groups within its area of influence.

The second case involves the British-based multinational company, British American Tobacco - BAT - and the Tupiniquim and Guarani Indians of the State of Espirito Santo. The Tupiniquim have traditionally occupied the coast of Espirito Santo north of the modern city of Vitoria, and in 1610 were given legal title to a part of their territory by the governor of the Captaincy of Espirito Santo. By 1940 the government of the State had sold off 10,000 hectares of this land to a private company for the production of charcoal. In the 1960's a company called ARACRUZ Cellulose, whose controlling interest is held by the Brazilian government but whose largest private shareholder is BAT through its Brazilian subsidiary, Souza Cruz, negotiated the 10,000 hectares and occupied a further 30,000 ha of Tupiniquim territory, expelling the Indians and using them as labour to cut down the forest on their own land for the planting of eucalyptus for the cellulose factory.

In 1979 the Tupiniquim re-occupied a small part of their original land and in November of that year FUNAI issued a document recognising their right to 3 small areas, totalling 8,500 hectares, but did not demarcate them. The Indians themselves began the demarcation, but FUNAI subsequently redemarcated the areas, reducing them by more than half. During this time the Tupiniquim of Pau Brasil, only 3 km from the factory, suffered continual harrassment and intimidation from the guards of ARACRUZ who threatened to burn down their houses. The area all around this village is totally devastated, and the air is seriously polluted. ARACRUZ funded the demarcation of the land around Pau Brasil, which was reduced from 1,500 ha to only 400 ha.

At the beginning of 1981 there were several meetings between ARACRUZ, FUNAI, and some of the Tupiniquim leaders. Jose Sizenando Tupiniquim Chief at Caieiras Velhas stated, that at the beginning ARACRUZ tried to persuade the Indians to give up all their land, remaining only with their village sites (which means the Indians' only option would be to work as cheap labour for the factory), and no compensation was offered. Finally, by the third meeting, the Indians gave in -as Sizenando said, they were all tired of being harrassed and pressured, and wanted some peace. He accepted, on behalf of his people, an agreement which was really forced upon him. Aracruz offered the ridiculous compensation of 5 million cruzeiros for the 3,000 hectares they had robbed from the Indians, will take their eucalyptus from the rest of the land, without paying any compensation whatever to the Indians for it, and for the fact that

the soil will be left degraded and impoverished. The 3,000 hectares taken from the Tupiniquim is roughly estimated as having a value of 622 million cruzeiros if used only for charcoal (a calculation made in a confidential report): ARACRUZ paid 5 million for it.³⁷

On June 5th, President Nobre da Veiga came to the village of Caieiras Velhas to distribute personally to 50 heads of household the sum of 20,000 cruzeiros (about £100). As he performed this sordid act, he threatened each one (counting out the notes one by one): "No more agitation. ARACRUZ and the government has helped you. Now go and work on your land - if there's any agitation you'll go to jail". He praised ARACRUZ, saying that the multinational company had made a generous gesture to the Indians, ceding land to them.³⁸ The rest of the 5 million will go towards the purchase of some motorised canoes (the Indians now need to go far up-river to fish, as the polluting effluent from the factory has completely destroyed the marine life in the region, and the Tupiniquim and Guarani fishing grounds), fishing nets, a tractor and soil preparation.

This year ARACRUZ is expected to make a profit of 4 billion cruzeiros, according to a report in the Estado de Sao Paulo. The factory produces 400,000 tons of cellulose a year, 5 times the production permitted by the anti-pollution laws in Europe. The company has appropriated, illegally, the major part of the land of the Tupiniquim, devastated the rest, and horribly polluted their environment in only two years of functioning. Souza Cruz, the BAT subsidiary, is considering buying out the share of BNDE (National Bank of Economic Development), in which case it would own 70% of the company.

Finally, all the pieces fall into place when we consider one further aspect of the case: the Tupiniquim had been in the region since the invasion of Brasil in 1500, and the Guarani since 1963.³⁹ In 1972 ARACRUZ tried to effect the transference of the Guarani to Minas Gerais, as the Guarani are a people who strongly maintain their cultural traditions, do not mix with the surrounding population, and are difficult to "emancipate". FUNAI had issued a "negative certificate"⁴⁰ to ARACRUZ with respect to the Tupiniquim in the region, thinking that, as the Tupiniquim are mixed with the local population, the agency - and ARACRUZ - could get away with it.

37. Personal communication from Jose Sizenando while the writer was in the village.

38. Witnessed by the writer. Also reported in Estado de Sao Paulo, 6th June 1981.

39. The Guarani are a people for whom land has a very special significance: it should be available to all, at all times. Thus, when land conflicts occur, the Guarani frequently move on, but always within a certain traditional area of Guarani migration.

40. A "negative certificate" is a document declaring an area "free of Indians".

However, in 1974 a Juruna Indian announced the existence of the Tupiniquim to a large scientific congress, and the remaining 611 Tupiniquim were found to be living in absolute penury in the middle of lands devastated by the eucalyptus plantations of ARACRUZ. As FUNAI could no longer claim their inexistence, nor transfer them, there was only one possible measure: and in 1976 the then President of FUNAI announced that the Tupiniquim were "ready for emancipation".

Policy had however not yet caught up with terrorism, and ARACRUZ resorted to the violent measures reported to secure the land and build the factory. Today the climate is more favourable, and with ex-officio emancipation just around the corner, the Tupiniquim may soon be declared non-Indian, and free to give up their remaining hectares to the persuasive multinational company.

The Tupiniquim VS ARACRUZ case exemplifies especially well the direct and indirect exploitation of the Indian by force and by policy since the Portuguese invasion. In 1500 the Tupiniquim numbered 80,000:⁴¹ today they are 611. Changes in governments and policy over the years gave and removed security of tenure of their land, while wars, illness and starvation decimated their population. At last, the economic strategies of the military regime in Brazil installed in 1964 led to the inevitable determination of policy by foreign investors, and the Tupiniquim, like all the Indians of Brazil, poorly-armed with minority legal status and a traitorous Guardian, were an easy and obvious victim.

The Tupiniquim, like many other Indian peoples, have a history of resistance, right up until the blow dealt to them in June this year. The future for them, as for all of the Brazilian Indians, is still an open question, but we can expect resistance to grow and strengthen, as the Indian peoples of other Latin American states being to form more effective organisations, and assert a Pan-American native identity.

41. Hemming, op. cit. pp.493, 494.

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