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ACCUMULATION AND AUTHORITARIANISM ON THE AMAZON FRONTIER
(BRAZIL)

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Introduction: forms of mediation on the frontier

My idea for this paper is to show that a study of the frontier can tell us something important about the nature of the State, which in turn will help explain much of what happens on the frontier. I want to talk about this as simply as possible, but the task itself is not simple. Before the argument can arrive at its simple statements, it will have to deal with the diversity of the empirical experiences of the frontier, and penetrate dense areas of theory. In regard to the former, I shall not describe the process of frontier expansion, but rather seek what the different frontiers have in common politically; as to the latter, while I cannot hope to do justice to their complexities, I shall try to keep my concepts consistent. (One of the most worrying developments of recent years is the assimilation of marxist concepts by the dominant empiricist discourse, or otherwise said, the use of analytical concepts as if they were empirical categories). I fully expect to raise more problems than I resolve, but in a discussion paper of this kind this in itself may be no bad thing.

I start with the assumption that what we witness on the frontier is - whatever else it may be - a process of economic accumulation, which is achieved by the appropriation of different kinds of surplus through diverse but historically determined relations of production and exchange. But this familiar formulation does not relieve me of the responsibility of thinking for the rest of the paper; and I certainly do not intend that the complex political and cultural realities of the frontier be understood as mere epiphenomena of the economic. Starting with accumulation is an analytical choice. For me, accumulation is the

context (much as the leafy green of the jungle itself is the context for the novels of Benedito Monteiro)¹, and for accumulation to occur on the frontier there must be political intervention. But there is no subsequent assumption that the economic directly determines the political (indeed, as we shall see, on the frontier the direction of determination often appears to be the reverse). What I do assume is that the process of accumulation, which is nothing other than exploitation by another name, implies class struggle, and that, beyond the intervention of the political in the economic in general, there are particular political "interventions", which constitute forms of mediation, which institutionalize this struggle, and so reinforce and reproduce the political dominance of specific classes and class fractions.

In broaching the question of determination we have run full tilt into the first of the theoretical obstacles. Ever since Althusser first spoke of "overdetermination"² it has been fashionable to be worried by the question, but it is equally interesting that no major work has ever elaborated his concept or employed it productively in empirical investigation. Reams have been written on the notion of the "relative autonomy of the political" (Poulantzas et al)³, of the "specificity of the political" (Laclau et al)⁴, but all these sophisticated schemes do not escape the seemingly inevitable resort to the economic which determines "in the last instance". So how should I expect to? The answer is, of course, that I do not. On the contrary, the development of the concept of mediation in this essay, far from dissolving a residual economism, rather represents (another) attempt to achieve a less mechanistic application of the classical heuristic trinity. It has always appeared curious to me that the real virtue of the "economic determining in the last instance" is so rarely noted; and that is that - like tomorrow - the "last instance" never comes.

" I am aware that in some intellectual circles such an approach can only appear conservative. The recent innovations of discourse analysis and argument theory, by relativising the historical process into the infinitely mutual determinations of different discourses have finally cut away the anchor of economism - but at the same time they have lost their marxism, and, in my view, their materialism, and have entered the contemporary revival of idealist perceptions of history. And discourse analysis is idealist for the very same reason that Weber is idealist, and in the same sense: in the first place, the idea of discourse itself is infinitely reducible, and only finds its final residence at the level of the individual⁵ (if there)⁶; in the second place, discourse analysis is as incapable as any empiricist analysis of establishing historical precedence or causality, without the imputation of motivation to individual social actors⁷ - and therefore slips willy-nilly into the received notion of ideas determining action. Thus, if I hold fast to a (contemporarily much maligned) economism, it is because, for me, the whole point of theory is its capacity for achieving causality without subjectivity - or at least in a way which does not necessarily involve the subjective judgements of the social scientist.

The "modern" answer to all this is that every and any political conjuncture must then be judged in terms of its "adaptability" to a privileged level of discourse⁸ (and a "completed" doctrine), which is (economist) marxism, which is invoked only to provide a theoretical guarantee (and indeed an "intellectual security" for the social scientist only similar to that which the empiricist finds in his/her "correlations"). But the theory is surely not so much a guarantee, whereby particular historical circumstances either negate or confirm a privileged theoretical device which is economism, as a reference, which is essential in all social scientific endeavour. Like the sextant, this theory can indicate

where we are historically, in terms of guidelines which have themselves been theorized a priori (latitude and longitude): in this way it is useful for navigating uncharted seas but cannot tell us either where we shall discover a new continent nor when the next storm will break. Economism, in short, is not the closed system it is often made out to be.

Beyond this general point, two comments are in order. In the first place there is no logical requirement that the movement of particular historical experiences will reproduce in its entirety the "movement of history"⁹ (although positivist laws of history do indeed require it). On the contrary, there is every possibility that in specific moments - especially of transition and transformation - the political will be determining. This is true of a "reflexive" process like frontier expansion (see below). In the second place (as Therborn observed, possibly following the clues given by Balibar and Laclau in their discussion of the feudal mode of production and extra-economic coercion)¹⁰, the heuristic levels of economy, polity and ideology entered political economy, or its critique, precisely during the emergence of a fully-fledged and industrialized capitalist economy, and evidently reflect the specific rationalities (or at least the rational "appearances") of this mode of production.¹¹ There is no reason to suppose that this heuristic division will be as necessary - or as analytically advantageous - when dealing with "mixed" forms of production, and the kind of accumulation which occurs on the frontier.

And in connection with this accumulation (I leave the question of determination behind for now, not doubting that it will rear its gorgon head again), what exactly do I mean by forms of mediation? In general, although it can descriptively be categorized as such, mediation is not equivalent to political intervention, which is usually understood as the political intervening in and organizing, the economic.

Rather than directing attention to the political "contribution" to accumulation as such, mediation refers to the domination of class by class which is implicit in any process of accumulation, and which implies a political struggle. Classes are firstly and necessarily, but not sufficiently, defined by their insertion into historically determinate relations of production, but their struggle, though founded in these economic relations, is a political phenomenon; and by institutionalizing this struggle, mediation therefore represents an intervention of the political in the political. But while political class struggle always exists (it is not an empirical category), neither the form nor the trajectory of the struggle can be assumed historically. In other words, in order to institutionalize the struggle, mediation actually constitutes the social forces in struggle insofar as it fixes the institutional terrain where struggles between them take place. The concept of mediation • thus vindicates the "political" as more than a mere vehicle for • "intervention" in the economic, and as a specific domain in its own • right (and so allows us to talk of the political, and finally of • particular forms of State, in a way which is not functionalist or • instrumentalist). Finally, while mediation is indeed a highly abstract • analytical concept, it is not as all-embracing as the "political" in • society, or even as the State itself. (Indeed, certain forms of mediation occur outside the State). But like any abstract concept it requires systematic historical specification before it can become a useful tool of social analysis, and subsequently it will be seen how the specific content of particular forms of mediation depend on distinct historical determinations such as the degree of development of the civil society.

These general observations are soon confirmed in the concrete context of the frontier, where the forms of mediation are certainly not restricted to economic policy-making and implementation, but rather

refer to the specific role of law in concentrating, rather than merely defending, private property in land; the specific role of bureaucracy in promoting the conditions for expanded accumulation; and the combined role of both in multiplying the forms and raising the rate of exploitation. To look first at the law, titles to land on the frontier do not confirm a regime of private property in the first instance, because contested titles (often issuing from different sectors of the State), interminable law-suits, and the administrative confusions which facilitate forgery and false registration turn all titles fluid, and property into a lottery. This situation promotes speculation; forcible levies of capital from the peasantry as titles are paid for time and time again; a rapid and predatory exploitation of the environment, and the final expulsion of the peasantry from the land - either by force, or through the "legal" mechanisms available to usury or commercial capital which holds the peasants' land in collateral. All this can represent accumulation, not only of the land itself, but of the value of the labour the peasants have invested in that land. In the case of the bureaucracy, not only do the complex and increasingly numerous criteria for occupation of the land compound the difficulties of the peasants laying claim to it, but the very contradictions within the bureaucracy, which are many, promote the expanded combination of labour with land, at the same moment that they make that combination ever more precarious, so accelerating the rate of expansion of the frontier, and consequently the rate of accumulation. A case in point was the push for a "social colonization" during the early seventies, a political initiative which foundered on the shifting sands of interministerial conflict, and which in its reversal left countless thousands of aspiring farmers as a reserve of cheap labour to supply the demands of capitalist enterprise - which was now enshrined by this shift in policy as the ideal vehicle for the occupation of the Amazon. Almost incidentally this example also serves to illustrate the

the way in which such mediations contribute to compose an integrated system of different forms of production on the frontier. More evident in this connection are the State tax and credit incentives to capitalist enterprise which serve to expand pre-capitalist relations of exploitation; or, more typically, the range of legal and bureaucratic mechanisms (and especially the "inoperation" of the land agencies and the "inapplication" of the direito de posse) which siphon peasant surplus into the circuits of commercial capital and so into the sphere of circulation of industrial capital itself.

Now, it is not my intention to make these examples more concrete or further to illustrate such legal and bureaucratic forms of mediation, if only because I have done so elsewhere.¹² But we have to be sure what it is we are asserting. Let us recall for a moment that for Weber the corpus of modern law, on the one hand, and the bureaucracy, on the other, were the two quintessential expressions of his transhistorical principle of "rationality".¹³ In a Weberian perspective law and bureaucracy on the frontier do not operate as they are "meant to". No doubt positivist accounts (especially the radically functionalist varieties like that of Huntington)¹⁴ would take them to task for inefficiency and ineffectiveness, not to mention particularism and corruption. But although Weber thought he was referring to a transhistorical process, he was in fact encapsulating (and projecting onto history) not merely the characteristic attributes of the capitalist State, but moreover of a particular form of capitalist State, where the "rational" operation of law and bureaucracy was indeed effective in mediating class struggle. If law and bureaucracy on the frontier do not conform to Weberian criteria, it is not that they are less "properly" legal or bureaucratic, but simply that they constitute different, specific and characteristic forms of mediation. These less "rational" mediations may not allow the State to appear so "neutral" or "objective" (if you will accept the anthropomorphic shorthand), but they

are perfectly politically effective in controlling labour, prizing apart producer and surplus at points both of production and of exchange, and in underpinning the linkage between different forms of production. (More correctly, they are effective in reproducing the economic and social relations through which these things are achieved). The point can be reinforced by taking note of the most widespread of all frontier political phenomena - violence. For Weber, once again, the State was defined precisely by its ability to make plausible claims to a monopoly of violence, whereas, very clearly, not only is private violence endemic on the frontier, but it is closely linked everywhere with the operations of bureaucracy and law. Legal confusion and force go hand in hand in expelling the peasants from the land; while bureaucratic contradictions only encourage the private police of the speculators (grileiros). And the police themselves, it is notorious, act inter-changeably in a "public" and a "private" capacity. This indicates, once more, that what we observe here are specific forms of mediation, which belong to a particular form of the political - a particular form of State. Mediations do not float free in the society, unattached to economic interest, and a full exposition would require investigation of the ways in which capital is "represented" in the bureaucracy, and "favoured" by legal apparatuses and procedure.¹⁵ But as long as the concept of mediation is clear, it can help us bring some analytical order to the confusing, and often apparently contradictory, political phenomena of the frontier.

The Frontier and the Formation of the State

As long as the concept of mediation exists in isolation, however, it can explain very little. It needs to be situated in its context, which is the formation of the State (and by extension the social formation itself, the content of mediation translating class practices from

or vice-versa). It is always somewhat hazardous for the social scientist to try to recapture the complexities of history in short order; but my idea here is not to "re-write history" in the image of one or two organizing concepts, but simply to pick out one or two traces of the imprint of the past on the present. And I am lucky to have a milestone as a point of departure, which is the work of Octavio Velho.¹⁶

Velho's aspiration was to discover the impact of the frontier on Brazilian society. Differently, from the studies of Turner¹⁷ in the United States, or indeed from that of Vianna Moog¹⁸ in Brazil itself, Velho chose to work at the level of political economy, rather than privileging myth, symbol, value and belief; and, moreover, situated his study in a thoroughly comparative framework. The full significance of his contribution has yet to be recognized.

Focussing on the development of capitalism in Brazil, Velho noted two crucial features: that it was "reflexive", in the sense that it responded to a powerful and autonomous process of capitalist growth at the "centre"; that it took place in the presence of free land. The importance of the latter is that the massive demand for staple goods and raw materials in the capitalist markets of the centre made it necessary, and the legacy of colonial institutions such as hacienda and fazenda made it possible, to maintain labour immobilized on the land so that it might produce for these markets, and not combine spontaneously with the free land to produce simply for its own subsistence. The presence of "historically available" political apparatuses to achieve this was crucial, insofar as where they did not exist, it was precisely the frontier, and not such institutions of labour control, as Velho called them, which marked the early period of capitalist development (as in the USA and Australia). In short, in Brazil and elsewhere in Latin America, one half of Marx's "double mill", which was universal private property in land, did not exist, and the simple expropriation of the direct

producers would do nothing to guarantee their concentration as proletariat in the nearest city. Thus the expansion of capitalism in the centre led precisely to the expansion of a sub-capitalist environment, where appropriation of the surplus was carried on through non-capitalist relations of production, which implied a clear absence of a "free labour market", and direct and often coercive control of labour. Note, of course, that the historical necessities were such because of a relative scarcity of labour. It is precisely when the Brazilian economy, for example, began to demonstrate the opposite quality - a relative "surplus" in the 1930s - that the pioneer frontier, as we know it today, began its rapid expansion.

Velho went on to develop his idea of "reflexive" capitalist development, and finally to make a distinction between this "authoritarian capitalism" and the "bourgeois capitalism" of the centre. Here Velho was mistaken (its always easy to see these things with the benefit of hindsight), because he fell into the "Wallerstein trap" of believing everything to be capitalism as long as it produces for a capitalist market, for profit - and as part of a "world capitalist system".¹⁹ It is true, of course, that - like your mother - there is only one capitalism - but it is defined by its relations of appropriation and not by its relations of exchange (a point Laclau made early on in his critique of Frank).²⁰ There is little point in pursuing this aspect of the argument, because it has been comprehensively made, and with brio, by Brenner in his devastating critique of Wallerstein.²¹ Rather, we can move immediately to assert that what Velho wanted to distinguish (yes, this line of argument is a bit cheeky) was the different roles of the political in the reproduction of this so-called "bourgeois capitalism" and "authoritarian capitalism", that is to distinguish the liberal from the authoritarian capitalist State. More specifically, what we want to know is what was the continuing impact, for example, of these institutions of labour

control at the political level after the transition to the dominance of capitalist social relations in Brazil.

The vexed question of transition was not something Velho concerned himself with. I too would prefer to avoid it, if only because there is not yet any satisfactory account of how the transition occurred in Latin America. Cardoso and Faletto still provide the most complete approach, in at least noting the necessary elements for such a transition.²² In the Brazilian case such elements include the relative scarcity of labour and the need for more highly productive labour to meet demand on the world market; the immigration of free labour (or, at least, labourers who settled for the colonato system)²³; the import of capital from the centre and the construction of ports, warehouses, railways etc. by wage labour; the growth of an urban environment and services sector; and the emergence of local manufacturing and industrial enterprise producing for the new domestic market that these activities created. But central to the question of transition is the role of the State (not necessarily a centralized State) which provided the collateral for the loans, which promoted the immigration - and which continued (paradoxically or not has yet to be seen) to intervene in the control of labour. Thus, if we are looking for a conceptual model which can untangle the question of transition in general,²⁴ that of Takahashi,²⁵ with its emphasis on the leading role of the State, seems to furnish the best insights for the process in Brazil. But more pertinent to our immediate purposes is the fact that the transition itself is only partial, insofar as, while capitalism may become dominant,²⁶ it comes to form part of a complex and "articulated" economic system of different relations and forms of production.

At this point I have to choose once again not to enter another dense debate, and this one on the nature of this "partial" transition, and whether capitalism will finally "dissolve", or will continue to

reproduce and reinforce these "pre-capitalist" relations (a debate which begins with Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg, and continues in our day with Rey, Bradby and Bettelheim)²⁷ because the outcome of the debate will not change the political realities of Brazil in the modern period. What is important to emphasize rather is that with the dominance of capitalism, a capitalist State is founded historically on the basis of an heterogeneous economic base, where different modes of production are present. This implies, in turn, that this State has the historical task not only of articulating the growing world capitalist market for goods and capital with the domestic economy (a task determined, Velho would say, by the "reflexive" nature of capitalist growth at home), but also of underpinning politically the articulation of different modes of production, to guarantee, for example, both the reproduction of the relations of appropriation within the different modes themselves and the reproduction of the mechanisms for the transfer of surplus from the subordinate modes to the dominant capitalism.

The nature of the transition and the heterogeneous economic base can be said to require certain necessary effects at the political level. Traditionally (and the tradition is not a long one) this argument has been put in one of two ways. Firstly it is argued that the political tasks of the State, as above, determine its continual involvement in the economic in order to control labour, and especially in order to repress, often violently, the dispossessed and exploited populations of the countryside. Florestan Fernandes has given us the most graphic account of these necessities.²⁸ The State is authoritarian because it is so deeply involved in the control of labour. Secondly, it is argued, following the dramatic Gramsci revival, that the heterogeneous nature of the economy makes it impossible to constitute all the subjects of the State as political citizens (something only possible with a homogeneous capitalist base, and then certainly not something which occurs automatically).²⁹

In the absence of a homogeneous citizenry with equal political rights (one person, one vote etc.) and equality before the law, it is historically impossible to construct a system of political domination through mechanisms of what Gramsci called "consensus and consent". The dependent bourgeoisie, a product of "reflexive" capitalist growth, is not a bourgeoisie conquérante which has perfected in its image the ultimate political achievement of this class - the nation-State. On the contrary, the bourgeoisie has to a large extent been created by the State, and requires * the active intervention of the State for its reproduction. It has not acquired a political-cultural leadership. It is not hegemonic. The State is authoritarian because it is the State of a non-hegemonic bourgeoisie.

These arguments have been and continue to be remarkably persuasive, but they are not without their problems, precisely because they define the political uniquely as a necessary effect of the economic. I do not wish to dismiss them, nor, of course, to criticize them for their "economism" as such, but rather to suggest an analysis of the determinations at work in history which is less mechanistic, and so more true to the historical reality. In Brazil, while there are certainly ruptures at the political level in the transition to capitalism (1889-91, 1930), these reflected not so much the transition itself perhaps, as its partial nature, and, especially, the strongly regional concentration of properly capitalist production. In connection with the "partiality" of the process, accounts are not lacking which attempt to trace the specifically political impact of the "authoritarian" institutions of the past on the political practices of the present,³⁰ but there are few which relate their arguments to the theoretical positions outlined above.³¹ The big problem that remains is that all capitalist States are to a greater or lesser extent involved, more or less continually, in labour control, and the practice of violence, and no capitalist State (and

-I'll come to this later) maintains the political domination of society through uniquely ideological mechanisms.³² I think we have all been bamboozled to some extent by the structuralist-Marxist³³ (and somewhat "ideal-typical") presentation of the liberal capitalist State, and (hush, whisper who dares?) by bourgeois ideology itself. I do not, of course, wish to deny the historical existence of the liberal State; rather I want to suggest that the kind of political distinctions which emerge between it and the State in Brazil, for example, at least on the basis of the arguments advanced so far, may still be largely descriptive. This is not merely because we are arguing at a very high level of abstraction, and therefore there is still the principal job to be done - as indeed there is - of making the examination of the political progressively more concrete through the investigation of the precise relations of political forces in the society at any one historical moment or in any one conjuncture; it is also because analytically as well as substantively, the argument is incomplete.

Looking back to Velho once again, I believe his argument remains truncated, and faulted, by his attempts to use historical categories to make analytical distinctions - and something similar occurs with the arguments advanced above. Not that concepts such as mode of production or articulation are merely historical or descriptive. Quite the contrary. But to make an analytical distinction between the liberal and the authoritarian capitalist State, we need concepts which are capable of "containing" the historical determinations, not in the sense of substituting for historical analysis, of course, but of directing it; while at the same time retaining the specificity (ha!) of the political - because it is this political, this State, which directs the process of accumulation. Turning once again to the pioneer frontier, this phenomenon would never have occurred in the form it has taken over the past fifty years, were it not for the monopoly of land and control of

labour inside the political institution of the large landed estate. In short, we should understand such historical determinations as are symbolized in the large landed estate as precipitating and shaping characteristic forms of mediation.

The State without History

There have been other, very sophisticated attempts to characterize the authoritarian State in Latin America which have been of a quite different order. I refer here to the large literature on the so-called "bureaucratic-authoritarian" State, epitomized in the work of O'Donnell, who has been the leading protagonist of the debate. O'Donnell began his characterization of the State³⁴ in terms of the "objective requirements" of capital in its "monopoly phase", during its "deepening process" and what have you. As the concern was to build a series of structural, explanatory "correspondences" between the contemporary demands of capital on the one hand, and its "political functions" on the other, the particular picture of the State which emerged from the argument had no history. Authoritarianism had arrived (or at least had reappeared) only recently in Latin America. In eschewing all historical categorizations, O'Donnell fell, rather too easily, into a functionalist investigation which could "map" the political reality far better than explain it. Later, and as if replying to this or a similar critique, O'Donnell began to argue that far from being "functionalist" his approach was founded in a complex, and comparative, theoretical model, which was rigorously Marxist in orientation. Beginning with the Apuntes article,³⁵ he inquired at the highest level of conceptual abstraction into the structural possibilities of political domination in capitalist society in general, and proceeded (in the Collier book)³⁶ to define the structural limitations of the particular form of the capitalist State which he called BA (bureaucratic-authoritarian). The importance of this approach for us is that he defined these "limitations", and thus the political determinations of this form of State, in terms of the impossibility of achieving certain forms of mediation.

O'Donnell argued for what must be, according to his analytical scheme, and still ignored the intricacies of the historical process. It is as if he believed that the bourgeoisie would always give a liberal democratic society to the classes it dominates, if only it had the "opportunity". Therborn³⁷ in demonstrating the protracted historical struggles and historical accidents³⁸ in the real process of the emergence of liberal democracies has given the lie to any such notion of the bourgeoisie as history's Father Christmas. If Velho tried - and failed - to make analytical distinctions from diverse historical categories, O'Donnell commits the contrary mistake of trying to explain the historical process uniquely through the use of highly abstract analytical tools. But the historical process is something assumed rather than demonstrated, and, for all his sophistication, without a sense of history's struggles he has no chance of grasping the nature of the political - or, in other words, correctly characterising the authoritarian State.

I have no time to recapitulate O'Donnell's arguments, even if that was to our purpose (and it is when I realize that I am about to give just three paragraphs to the most serious analyst of the State in ^{Latin America in} recent years that I see how fast I am going), but I do wish to note just two mistaken "analytical" outcomes which seem to follow from this basic mistake, this lack of history. The first is that the specific mediations of "classic" bourgeois rule which are not available - or only "partially" so - in contemporary Latin America, have as their "objective referents" the citizenry, the nation and the people: that is they are all mediations which translate and disguise the political presence of the State into other less "oppressive" and more "participatory" qualities. In other words, in O'Donnell's view, they are all uniquely ideological;³⁹ and, moreover, it appears in terms of the entire analytical scheme that mediation as such can only be ideological. This has to do, I suspect, not only with the "ideal-typical" formulation of the liberal State by structural-Marxism,

but also with the less benign influences of the Gramsci revival - where everything is ideological or it is nothing (it is in the air, it is everywhere). The second is that for O'Donnell the impossibility of achieving such mediations seems to derive from an incapacity in the State itself (this is admittedly rather unfair, as a great part of the analytical argument goes to prove that the State is merely one aspect of contradictory social relations etc.), rather than from an incapacity in the bourgeoisie. In my view, on the contrary, mediation is the institutionalization of class struggle, and it is a class, the bourgeoisie in this case, which either does or does not have the capacity to mediate its rule to other classes; moreover, one system of (bourgeois) political domination is to be distinguished from another, not merely, if at all, by the "absence" of certain mediations,⁴⁰ ideological or not, but by the specific political content of the system's characteristic forms of mediation. And mediation is always essentially political in the sense of achieving political domination.

Hegemony and Mediation

I have not criticised Velho and O'Donnell for the sake of it, but to illustrate that any reconstruction of the formation of the authoritarian State in Latin America would require both the retrieval of historical categories and the elaboration of analytical concepts in a dual yet unified discourse. The essays which come closest to what I have in mind are those by Cardoso and Faletto, Norberto Lechner, and Liliana de Riz.⁴¹ In my view, the historical content of authoritarianism is not finally given by the greater or lesser involvement of the State in labour control, nor by the more-or-less widespread use of violence (both of them, after all, are empirical measures); nor by the abstract availability to the dominant classes of certain ideological mediations. No, the content of authoritarianism must be referred to the political practices of these classes as expressed

through characteristic forms of mediation, such as the specific operations of law and bureaucracy on the frontier, and their specific links with the use of violence (see below). Mediation is an analytical concept, but actual forms of mediation must be explained historically; these forms may have their ideological uses, but they are primarily political. Forms of mediation are not free of historical determinations, but may themselves determine the mode and direction of economic accumulation.

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Before examining further these last statements, let us take as an example the content of one form of mediation which is far from the context of the frontier - that of organized labour in the sindicato or trade union. The point to note is that while the institution of sindicato/ trade union looks very similar in liberal and authoritarian States, and while this institution certainly mediates the class struggle in both contexts, its political content differs in one and the other. The most direct way of demonstrating this is to recall for a moment Gramsci's distinction between State and civil society (so very different from the Hegelian one). For Gramsci the institutions of State would include executive, bureaucracy, army, police, courts etc., while amongst those of civil society were schools, churches, neighbourhood associations, political parties - and trades unions. Trades unions, in the liberal context, are more or less autonomous organizations which play a part in representing the interests of civil society to the State; while in Latin America sindicatos are integrated into the bureaucracy and clearly translate the interests of capital to civil society.⁴² Such examples can be multiplied and an argument (not necessarily the same argument) made to distinguish differing content from similarity of appearance in such diverse institutions as parliament and the police. Most recently, Malloy has argued a cogent case in similar vein for the social security systems of Brazil.⁴³

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"Why is this important? Because it means we can begin to talk concretely about authoritarianism for a start. Until recently, general attempts to characterize the political in these social formations might assert, for example, that the State was less "relatively autonomous" than in liberal contexts. I am pretty sure that this formulation is a fudge, and not only because it illegitimately poses an analytical statement in empirical terms. Yes, I know what is being referred to. It is the "relative autonomy" of the liberal State; but surely the point of such theory is to prove that the State which "exists" "over and above" the society is mere illusion - an appearance without substance? In fact, it seems that a straightforward historical judgement is being passed off, once again, as an analytical distinction. This judgement simply tells us that a continual intervention of the State in the economic realm has been necessary to the continuing process of accumulation in Latin America, and it is a judgement which may rely to a greater or lesser extent on propositions regarding the leading role of political conquest, on the one hand, in determining the overall path of economic development, and of the State, on the other, in the transition to capitalism. But the question still remains of what in these (more or less plausible) propositions serves to distinguish the State in Latin America from that in Bismarck's Germany, or in Louis Napoleon's France? What do they tell us about the intrinsic nature of this State? In my view, once again, the simple notion of political intervention in the economic is not sufficient to define authoritarianism, or to establish anything more than a "quantitative" - rather than a "qualitative" or analytical - difference between capitalist States of the periphery and those of the centre.

We noted that the bourgeoisie in Latin America is not hegemonic, and, so the argument goes, cannot rule through mechanisms of consensus and consent like its counterpart in liberal democratic formations. Hence, while the "central" capitalist classes can enjoy their ideological

domination in peace, those of the "periphery" are constantly obliged to resort to violence and other overt forms of political control. This kind of "revived" Gramscian thinking evidently informs O'Donnell's characterization of the BA State as the political in the absence of ideological mediations, and Malloy's interesting insight that it is the State which takes on the "hegemonic role" in the reproduction of the system of political domination in Latin America.⁴⁴ But while Gramsci himself indeed referred the concept of hegemony to the reproduction of stable systems of domination in advanced capitalist societies, the most recent advances in the theory have retrieved its Leninist origins, and referred it back to the conjuncture - the moment of the emergence of a political-cultural leadership.⁴⁵ Hegemony, it is suggested, only has meaning at the level of the conjuncture, and, by implication, no system of political domination is reproduced by ideological mechanisms alone (a notion which always appeared slightly absurd to me). The question of reproduction would not then be posed uniquely in terms of hegemony, and the rather crude dichotomy of consensus and consent on the one hand, and force on the other, but in terms of the kind of civil society which exists, and the forms of political mediation which are historically available. In this way, an investigation of different forms of political domination neither has to defer to "first principles" at each step, in order to establish the exact economic determination of each analytical element; nor is it confined at each moment to ultimately indeterminate relations of social forces in particular conjunctures. No. What differentiates liberal democratic from authoritarian States (or from fascist States for that matter) are the sometimes [apparently] similar but in content very different, characteristic forms of political mediation.

When I first went to Brazil in 1970, and then for longer in 1971-72, a lot of mostly young people were being pulled off the streets and out of their homes, and tortured. Some, not a few, were killed; many others

disappeared. I was shocked. And scared. Then I read Amnesty's
- Report on the Allegations of Torture in Brazil.⁴⁶ I was sickened.

This is what it is like to live under an authoritarian State, I said to myself. Since that time the British government has been condemned for the torture of political prisoners by the International Court at the Hague. British soldiers in Northern Ireland are killing children of thirteen and fourteen years old by shooting plastic bullets at their heads. In repressing the city riots this summer our police have beaten people to death and broken their spines. Do I then say, ah yes, this is what it is like to live under a liberal democratic State?

Getting Back to the Frontier

What have all these dilemmas and polemics to do with the frontier? (you will be asking yourselves). I cannot pretend that the answer is self-evident, but not do I believe that it is difficult to establish the connections. These are of two sorts: the analytical, or those made at the level of scientific inquiry itself; and the substantive, which locate the frontier within the larger formation of State and society.

To take the former first, we have been debating analytical approaches to the characterization of the State, and it is on the frontier that many of the elements of the analysis are immediately available to empirical investigation and verification. I refer especially to the operations of law and bureaucracy and the intricate links of both with the widespread violence of the frontier. Not that such forms of mediation are only present on the frontier (the concept is clearly of universal application in class society), nor do these forms of mediation exhaust the forms present in the society. But I would argue that such forms of mediation take on a peculiarly pure appearance on the frontier, where they are "revealed" as nowhere else in the society. On the one hand, this may be owing to a relative reduction in ideological overlays, such that in the society at large it may be seen what is said, while on the

frontier it is seen what is done; but on the other, more concretely, it is owing, as I argue below, to the special role of these mediations in achieving accumulation on the frontier. Thus, as a topic for empirical investigation, (and all appearances of this essay notwithstanding I am committed to empirical investigation), the study of the frontier has a much more than "peripheral" or "exotic" significance. This in itself is no small point. But for our immediate purposes, which is precisely the study of the frontier itself, it is the reverse argument which is the more important: that without understanding the genesis and formation of the authoritarian State, and its characteristic forms of mediation, we cannot understand the process of frontier expansion - which will, on the contrary, continue to appear haphazard, contradictory, and "irrational". It is because the State is thus, that the frontier is so.

Substantively, the frontier as an extension of the economic territory sees a reproduction of the same articulated economic system as subsists in the society at large, and, moreover, demonstrates the key place of the political not only in achieving accumulation in the short term, but, in the long, in ^{apuntalar-sustener} underpinning the complex links of this system. It is true that at the cutting edge of the frontier, at the furthest point of penetration, we can find advanced capitalist enterprise, and often the flag-bearers of the multi-national corporations. But the advance of the frontier itself, far from implanting a universal regime of capitalist social relations, seems to ^{engendrar} spawn a wide gamut of petty commodity production, feudal and even slave relations. On the surface these different forms of production make strange bedfellows, but the equally wide range of political mediation insures not only the capture of the diverse surpluses within the sphere of circulation of industrial capital, but also quickens the concentration of property, or better, possession of land, and so the reproduction of the same monopoly conditions which impell the frontier forward - the first place.

Such transfers of surplus may be achieved in a number of different ways, and this is especially true during the early part of the "frontier cycle" when land prices are rapidly rising. Confining our illustration uniquely to petty commodity producers, for the sake of clarity, we may note, firstly, that there is the direct appropriation of the natural environment, and the transfer of "natural" products to markets or production processes outside the region. Secondly, there may occur more or less direct transfers through the forcible capital gains on land exacted from the peasants, or the speculative gains on land made possible by their labour. Thirdly, the high productivity of the frontier farmer producing on highly fertile soils, and the extremely low farm-gate prices (imposed from the top down onto the peasants) open up wide marketing margins and a high rate of commercial profit. Finally, the super-exploitation of the peasants, involving not merely a transfer of surplus-product, but also the transfer of a necessary-product (the products respectively of surplus-labour and necessary-labour, and the "double" exploitation achieved through the decapitalization of the peasant enterprise by, for example, leaching the soil), not only raises again the * rate of transfer from the frontier, but contributes to reproduce the whole frontier cycle by depleting the soil and forcing the peasants again to seek their subsistence further afield. In these different ways accumulation on the frontier feeds accumulation within the national economy. // *

It is in this context - not of the articulated economic system itself, of course, but of the way it is imposed and reproduced - that it is useful to rehabilitate the concept of primitive accumulation.⁴⁴ It is by now only too obvious that such a concept cannot imply - as it did in Capital⁴⁸ - the universal transformation of peasantry to proletariat, and the creation of the essential conditions for capitalist growth (rather it implies the reproduction and extension - see below - of the essential conditions for capitalist growth in dependent capitalism);

but it does emphasize, entirely correctly, not only the role of the political in general, but of violence in particular, in achieving this accumulation. "The methods of primitive accumulation are anything but idyllic. . .", said Marx, "in actual history it is notorious that conquest, enslavement, robbery, murder, briefly FORCE, play the great part."⁴⁹

But, of course, it is not merely a question of violence. What emerges from an investigation of the role of law (what Gramsci called the negative aspect of the whole positive, civilizing task of the State) and bureaucracy, not to forget the police and the army, is the continuing necessity for specific forms of mediation in this process of accumulation. These mediations, we have already noted, cannot in general be understood merely as the policy interventions of a capitalist State in the regulation of a contradictory and always disequilibriated economy, and this is especially true of the frontier for at least two motives. On the one hand, we are never merely talking of the reproduction of a system (a point I shall take up in a moment) with its institutionalized and more-or-less sophisticated relations of appropriation and exchange - but of the extension and imposition of a system. This it is which requires the mechanisms of primitive accumulation. "On the other had, these mechanisms, differently from those noted by Marx, "all of which employed the power of the State, the concentrated and organized force of society",⁵⁰ often operate outside the realm of State (another important point I return to below). In the light of these observations, it is clear that on the frontier the political is not merely less "relatively autonomous": if it is not exactly indistinguishable from the economic, there is certainly nothing to distinguish one as more necessary than the other (the necessity is mutual) in the continuing process of accumulation.

Primitive accumulation is admittedly a rather loose concept, but it does have the advantage of focussing on the continual dispossession of the peasantry in an expansion of capitalism through political force and mediation. If this same economic expansion is also understood, as it must be, as an expanding dominance of capitalism within what is still a heterogeneous productive base, then the contemporary process of frontier expansion clearly reflects the total historical process of capitalist "development" in the society as a whole. It is as if the frontier "captures" the key elements of capital's history in the present, and holds them in "historical suspension". Historically, capitalism arrived through a combination of the dynamics of its own expansion and political imposition: and debates over the nature of the transition to capitalism in Latin America probably have much to learn from the intricate interplay of market forces, political mediation and violence in the process of frontier accumulation. Brazilian development, wrote J.F. Normano, is "a process of putting an economic substance in the political arena . . . the aim was and is the same - the extension of the economic territory". For him it was clear that the frontier was to form the society, and fifty years ago he could prophecy that "no search for new markets, for new territories, for raw materials is necessary. Everything exists and waits for the new bandeirantes equipped with initiative, capital and modern methods. It is a quest for a new move of the frontier".⁵¹ As the Indians of the Amazon know to their cost, the new bandeirantes have indeed arrived, and in forcing forward the frontier have provided the perfect contemporary metaphor for capital's "conquest" of the continent.

Conclusion: Reproduction and Expansion

Most of our argument tends towards the conclusion that the frontier is not essentially different from the society at large. Thus any comparison between the institutionalized relations of appropriation

and sophisticated mechanisms of the society as such, and the predatory exploitation of the frontier with its lawlessness and violence, better serves a rather romanticised and superficial reaction to the "myth of frontier" than a proper understanding of the relationships between frontier and society. The forms of political mediation historically required to reproduce the relations of accumulation on the frontier are not peculiar to the frontier. No more is violence. Political "interventions" of this kind have always been necessary to the extraction of surplus in the Brazilian economy - despite the clear dominance of the wage relation in that economy. So the "wild frontier" is not in general atypical in its political economy, but rather reveals the place of the political in the overall growth of capitalism in the society. However, there is one way in which the frontier is undeniably different: while elsewhere in the society we speak of political mediations institutionalizing class struggle and so reproducing certain economic relations, on the frontier the economic system is not merely reproduced (and, as elsewhere, at a higher level), but actually extended. Why is this important?

One of the dangers of any notion of reproduction in political analysis is its homogenizing effect. Especially in structuralist Marxist thinking all elements which are not seen actively to undermine capitalist relations, including policies, parties, bureaucracy and law, automatically belong to the range of capital's "functional imperatives", which supposedly reproduce the capitalist system. Capitalism becomes co-extensive with the "social totality", and despite the manifest disparity of different political practices they all become homogenous "results" or "creations" of capitalism - insofar, of course, as they reproduce it. The virtue of the frontier in this connection is that it proves intractable to assimilation into this scheme of things. On the frontier, relations cannot simply be reproduced by the multiple manifestations of capital at the legal, political and ideological levels - partly because it is impossible

to reproduce what is not already there. The frontier necessarily demands an extension of the economic and political environment, which depends on political imposition - including both the violence and the forms of mediation found on the frontier. To some degree such active mediations are called for precisely because (and this is not, I think, in contradiction to what was said above) class struggles are not easily "institutionalized" - and probably because the struggles which emerge from antagonisms between different forms of production (peasantry versus big capital for example) can never be so far institutionalized as those emerging from a "symmetrical" relation of exploitation. Thus in explaining the frontier process it becomes impossible to adhere to a simple economism. Political mediations determine frontier expansion and accumulation, even if these mediations characterize a particular form of State which is itself founded upon historically determinate relations of appropriation and exchange. The political is not "relatively autonomous" but is specific insofar as these mediations themselves constitute the social / ^{forces} in the struggle implicit in the process of accumulation. There is nothing homogeneous about the conflictive process of capitalist expansion on the frontier, but if the range of political mediations did not "resolve" the conflicts more often than not in capital's favour, the frontier as we know it would not advance at all. In the present as in the past the economic frontier is being extended politically - not by a conspiracy but through a contradictory process of struggle. Just as liberal democracy is not an historical gift from the bourgeoisie to the working class, so violence on the frontier is finally not a sadistic whim of the capitalists or their agents, but a sign of bitter resistance to capital's advance.

Earlier I had reason to mention Weber's definition of the State as that political organization capable of making plausible claims to exercise a monopoly of violence, but I omitted the final ingredient of that definition, which indeed is essential to Weber's "idea" of State,

State; that such claims must be exercised throughout a given territory.⁵²

Operating with such a definition one would have to conclude that the widespread private violence on the frontier exists "beyond the boundaries" of the State (beyond that territory of "plausible claims"), precisely because the frontier is not merely reproduction but extension. But .

a conclusion is evidently impossible in the light of the preceding argument, which throws into relief the role of political mediation - which in the cases of law and bureaucracy belongs precisely to the political instance, the realm of State - in determining and directing frontier expansion. No, the fact is, as I noted earlier, that Weber was not talking of all States, as he thought, but of a particular form of capitalist State, and the concomitant creation of the nation-State - which is the bourgeois historical construct par excellence. Hence the centrality of the question of territory. In the capitalist State to which he implicitly refers, the exercise of violence is transferred out of the hands of particulars (where it rested in the feudal State, for example), and passes under the control of a supposedly impartial "third actor" (courts etc.), which applies it according to normative rules (the laws of the land) - which are themselves, in turn, supposedly "agreed" by all the citizens of the nation-State. The State can then appear as the "principle of representation" of all these citizens equally, and all indeed are equal before the law. Hence the importance of the idea of monopoly to Weber's definition. Such investment of violence in a "third actor" is an important element of "legitimacy", in Weber's terms, in the liberal form of capitalist State, and represents a particular form of political mediation of class domination (which has, moreover, evident ideological implications). Perhaps it is possible to argue that a residue of such "legitimacy" subsists in all capitalist States which operate a corpus of modern and "normative" law; but in Brazil, for example, not only have deep doubts been cast on the normative content of law and law-making (and the unpredictability of law-

making and the legal process described by the Weberian category of "bureaucratic charisma"),⁵³ but - to return to the point - there is evidently no State monopoly of violence on the frontier. That this monopoly does not "exist" should by now cause no surprise, for this

* State is no nation-State, with a universal citizenry equal before the law. Peasants are certainly not citizens. Still less are Indians.

But, as I said above, the widespread violence cannot possibly be conceived as an aberration resulting from the "lawlessness" of the frontier. No. The conclusion is inescapable that this violence, in its manifold links with the operation of law and bureaucracy, is itself a form of political mediation,⁵⁴ which is evidently different from the supposedly impartial exercise of violence in the liberal State, and specific therefore to the authoritarian State.

Table 4

Indicators of Government Activities in Colonization Compared by Year with Indicators of Activities Related to Large Scale Enterprise

Colonization--PIC Altamira and Itaituba		Large Enterprise	
INCRA Budgets (Cr\$). ¹	INCRA Personnel	INCRA Land Tenure Classification--PF Altamira (Ha) ²	Fiscal Incentives SUDAM Disbursements (Cr\$) ¹
1970			632,758,447
1971			561,533,792
1972	128,265,518	1,228	424,298,206
1973	159,330,205	1,651	477,618,018
1974	119,719,014	833	487,391,435
1975	112,065,111	700	923,671,516
1976	95,190,642	517	652,922,274
1977	39,700,639	248	504,926,063

¹Values corrected to 1977 equivalents following Conjuntura Econômica, 324 (April) 1978: Index 2, Column 2.

²Two Projetos Fundiarios--PF Santarim and PF Cachimbo--were established within the original jurisdiction of PF Altamira in 1975 and 1977 respectively. Figures here include all three PFs.

Sources: INCRA CR-01, FF/FFP; SUDAM, DAI/DPOI.

FOOTNOTES

1. I am thinking of novels like Verde vagamundo.
2. L. Althusser, "Contradiction and overdetermination" in For Marx, Part 3, Allen Lane 1969. This essay was first published in French in December 1962 in La Pensée.

The concept of overdetermination is not Althusser's own, but borrowed from other disciplines. Although "not particularly taken by this term", he introduced it into his analysis in order to avoid the simple economism which assumes a mechanistic determination of the political and ideological by the economic. By suggesting, through this notion, that these other instances could themselves react upon and influence the economic, he attempted to "relativize" and "problematize" this rigid heuristic orientation.
3. N. Poulantzas 1968 Pouvoir politique et classes sociales, Maspero, Paris.
1973 "Marxism and social classes", New Left Review, No. 78.
4. E. Laclau 1975 "The specificity of the political", Economy and Society, vol. 4., no. 1.
5. Foucault, for one, would deny this, and argue that discourse properly attaches to institutions (prisons, hospitals, administrative organs, etc.); but the problem with this assertion is that the institutions themselves cannot be defined except in terms of relations of power between individuals (or types of individuals).
6. Laing for instance (The Divided Self, The Self and Others, The Politics of Experience) would not accept any idea of the individual as in any way a "final" social unit. Nor, for that matter, would novelists such as Doris Lessing.
7. This is not, of course, the intention of such analysis. Discourse analysis is consciously differentiated from the simple level of ideas, and rather directs attention to the social factors which give rise to subjectivity - but then so does social psychology of the Skinnerian sort, not to mention Parsonian sociological "theory". More importantly, the discourse analysts are careful to insist that discourse must not be caricatured as a category that replaces the "economic" as determining in the last instance. It is only one, if a very important, level of analysis. But what is not then clear is how it relates to other available "levels of analysis".
8. The immediate difficulty here is that to do otherwise is to judge the conjuncture simply in terms of itself, which is, in effect, to return to the Weberian process of ideal typing according to the subjective notions of value-relevance etc. of the investigator.

9. The "movement of history" is real, but only insofar as it is created theoretically. Theoretical concepts are rational but history is not. History is rather an irrational and contradictory process which nevertheless requires rational, i.e. theoretical, explanation if we are to dominate it - and not have it dominate us.
10. G. Therborn 1976 Science, class and society New Left Books, London.
E. Balibar 1970 Reading Capital, London (in collaboration with L. Althusser)
E. Laclau op.cit. (essay republished in Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory, New Left Books, London).
11. Compare also L. Colletti's essay on "Marxism as a Sociology" in From Rousseau to Lenin, New Left Books, 1972, where he argues that social relations of production must be understood as precisely that i.e. relations which are simultaneously political and ideological.
12. Joe Poweraker 1981 The Struggle for Land: a political economy of the pioneer frontier in Brazil from 1930 to the present, Cambridge University Press. Chapters 4 to 7 provide a fairly complete description and analysis of such forms of mediation.
13. M. Weber 1964 Theory of social and economic organization (ed. Talcott Parsons) Free Press.
14. Compare S. Huntington 1968 Political Order in Changing Societies, Yale University Press. In my opinion this is the best book of its kind.
15. This is something I do in the book but regrettably have no space for here.
16. O. G. Velho 1973 Modes of capitalist development, peasantry and the moving frontier, Ph.D. thesis, University of Manchester; 1972 Frentes de expansao e estrutura agraria, Zahar, Rio de Janeiro; 1976 Capitalismo autoritario e campesinato, DIFEL, Sao Paulo (this last being the book of the thesis).
17. F. J. Turner 1921 The Frontier in American history Henry Holt, N.Y.
18. Vianna Moog 1955 Bandeirantes e pioneiros, Globo, Rio de Janeiro.
19. E. Wallerstein 1974 The Modern World System vol. 1. Academic Press, New York.
20. E. Laclau 1971 "Feudalism and capitalism in Latin America" New Left Review no. 67.
21. R. Brenner 1977 "The origins of capitalist development: a critique of neo-Smithian Marxism" , New Left Review no. 104.
22. F. H. Cardoso & E. Faletto 1969 Dependencia y desarrollo en America Latina, Siglo XXI.
23. T. H. Holloway 1977 "The coffee colono of Sao Paulo, Brazil: migration and mobility 1880-1930", in eds. K. Duncan and I. Routledge Land and Labour in Latin America, Cambridge University Press.

24. Some critics deny the very possibility of an account of transition in general, and assert that there are as many "transitions" as there are Latin American States. In this view any theory of transition in general necessarily excludes the specific determinations within national conjunctures. I do ^{not} agree. Firstly because the different Latin American nations are equally, if differentially, subject to such broad historical influences as the growth of the world market and the export of capital, and equally contain a similar mix of pre-capitalist forms of production and distribution - within remarkably similar socio-economic institutions - as a result of the colonial legacy. Secondly, because the attempt to theorize such transition in general in the European context by Dobb in his Studies in the Development of Capitalism precipitated one of the most fecund debates in the social sciences in this century (in the pages of Science and Society in the early fifties, and edited by R. Hilton in The Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism, 1976), which found its intellectual legacy in Perry Anderson's Lineages of the Absolutist State - a book which pays close attention to national realities and which represents marxist historiography at its least dogmatic.

25. K. Takahashi 1952 "A contribution to the discussion" Science and Society (republished in ed. R. Hilton 1976 The transition from feudalism to capitalism New Left Books, London).

Two clearly different paths of "transition to capitalism" emerged during the famous debate: that through the progressive differentiation of petty commodity production (a real emergence of capitalist relations); and that promoted, progressively again, by commercial capital, which fosters outworking, manufacture and finally industry to ensure regular supplies in sufficient volume for its exchange transactions. The latter path was more likely to involve the direct intervention of the State, and certainly seems nearer the "majority" process in Latin America.

26. To assert that capitalism is dominant is to make an analytical and not an empirical statement, which means that all forms of production are either production for subsistence, or subordinate, directly or indirectly, to the process of capital accumulation within capitalist social relations. Compare chapter 9 of my book.

27 V.I. Lenin 1967 The development of capitalism in Russia, Progress Publishers, Moscow.

R. Luxemburg 1973 The accumulation of capital, Monthly Review Press, New York.

Bettelheim 1972 "Theoretical comments" in ed. A. Emmanuel Unequal Exchange, New Left Books, London.

P-P. Rey 1973 Les Alliances des Classes, Maspero, Paris.

B. Bradby 1975 "The destruction of natural economy" Economy and Society, vol.4 no.2.

I do enter the debate (perhaps foolishly) in Chapter 9 of my book.

28. F. Fernandes 1968 "Capitalismo agrario e mudanca social" in Sociedade de classes e desenvolvimento, Zahar, Rio de Janeiro.
29. Compare G. Therborn 1977 "The rule of capital and the rise of democracy", New Left Review no. 103., where he emphasizes the role of the "continuous struggle" of the working class in achieving liberal democracy (and see below).
30. Compare eg R. Faoro 1975 Os donos do poder: formacao do patronato politico brasileiro, Globo, Porto Alegre; H. Jaguaribe 1969 Desenvolvimento economico e desenvolvimento politico, Fundo de Cultura, Rio; Caio Prado Jr. 1966 A revolucao brasileira, Brasiliense Sao Paulo; and even P Schmitter 1971 Interest conflict and political change in Brazil, Stanford University Press.
31. Caio Prado Jr. op.cit. and F.H. Cardoso 1975 Autoritarismo e democratizacao, Paz e Terra, Rio, are two of the few notable exceptions.
32. The point here, which I return to at the end of the essay, is that some forms of capitalist State achieve consent for State violence, while some do not, and this is crucial in determining the characteristic forms of mediation operating in the different systems of domination.
33. I am thinking once again of Poulantzas. An approach to the political (although a different type of State) which is quite free of such "structuralist" tendencies is eg P. Anderson Lineages of the Absolutist State, New Left Books, 1974.
34. G. O'Donnell 1977 "Reflexiones sobre las tendencias de cambio del Estado burocratico-autoritario" Revista Mexicana de Sociologia vol. 39. no. 1.
35. G. O'Donnell 1978 "Apuntes para una teoria del Estado" Estudios Sociales Centroamericanos Ano. VII. no. 20.
36. G. O'Donnell 1979 "Tensions in the bureaucratic-authoritarian State and the question of democracy" ed. D. Collier The New Authoritarianism in Latin America, Princeton University Press.
37. G. Therborn 1977 op.cit.
38. "The entire historical process", said Trotsky, "is a refraction of historical laws through the accidental" (which shows that even Trotsky had his positivist moments).
39. It is worth emphasizing that this is O'Donnell's view and not my own. If we take the notion of citizenry, for example, this is composed of legal categories which represent a form of political domination, where consent is achieved precisely through such legal categories. The legal apparatus creates its own "regime of truth". And, in general, ideology always "attaches" to particular political institutions or practices (my original suspicion of Laclau's adoption of the Althusserian notion of "interpellation", a suspicion that has not much abated over time, was that it seemed to characterize ideology as "unattached"). The notion of "people", of course, is not a legal category, and nor is "nation" (in the way O'Donnell uses it). But this is precisely the

point that, for O'Donnell, mediation is essentially ideological, and ideology, in his view, still spells "illusion" and "false consciousness". In my view, a continuing adherence to economism does not necessarily entail such a simpliste acceptance of the real.

40. It is a moot logical point but x being part of y can tell us something about y; whereas x not being part of z tells us nothing about z except that it is not y - which we already knew.
41. F. H. Cardoso & E. Faletto 1977 "Estado y processo politico en America Latina" Revista Mexicana de Sociologia vol. 39. no. 2.; Norberto Lechner 1977 "La crisis del estado en America Latina" ibid. and 1977 "La cuestion del estado en el capitalismo dependiente" in Estudios Sociales Centroamericanos Ano VI.no.16.; Liliana de Riz Revista Mexicana de Sociologia ibidem.
42. Some commentators would object on principle to this statement and assert that the role of the sindicato has been different historically in the different Latin American nations. Indeed it has. But is this sufficient reason to reject an analytical distinction between the sindicato and the trade union as forms of mediation? Certainly, exceptions might be found. The CGTP in Peru? The COB in Bolivia? But as I am making an analytical statement and not an empirical generalization, one or two stray cases do not damage the argument. Overall, the empirical evidence, especially in pre-coup Uruguay and Chile, the "classic" democracies, overwhelmingly supports it.
43. J. Malloy 1979 The politics of social security in Brazil, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh.
44. J. Malloy, in his presentation on "Corporatism and authoritarianism in Latin America" to the Department of Government of the University of Essex, November 1980.
45. eg Chantal Mouffe 1979 "Hegemony and ideology in Gramsci" in ed. C.Mouffe Gramsci and Marxist Theory Routledge and Kegan Paul.
46. Amnesty International 1972 Report on Allegations of Torture in Brazil, London.
47. As I have tried to do in Chapter 8 of my book.
48. K. Marx 1970 Capital vol.1. Book VIII "The so-called primitive accumulation". Lawrence & Wishart, London.
49. K. Marx op.cit.
50. K. Marx op.cit.
51. J.F. Normano 1935 Brazil: a study of economic types, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.
52. M.Weber op.cit.
53. L.Klein 1976 "A nova ordem legal e a redefinicao das bases de legitimidade" in eds. Klein & M.Figuereido Legitimidade e coercao

no Brasil pos 64, Foreense, Rio de Janeiro.

54. If sindicatos are a specific form of mediation existing within the State bureaucracy, why should the form of mediation which is violence not be exercised from the civil society? Once again, the argument does not depend on how much violence is used or when, but on the political content of violence as a form of mediation, which makes the distinction analytical rather than empirical.

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TABLE 1

Amazonia: Aspects of the Economically Active Population (EAP)—1950, 1960, and 1970

Category/Year	Sector						Total	
	Primary ^a		Secondary		Tertiary			
EAP (thousands)								
1950	405.3	(811.4)	36.8	(53.8)	138.3	(204.5)	580.4	(1,069.7)
1960	518.0	(1,169.4)	48.1	(71.3)	219.7	(335.2)	785.8	(1,576.0)
1970 ^b	593.6	(1,358.8)	109.7	(156.6)	319.1	(475.9)	1,022.4	(1,991.3)
Distribution (percent)								
1950	69.8	(75.9)	6.3	(5.0)	23.8	(19.1)	100.0	(100.0)
1960	65.9	(74.2)	6.1	(4.5)	28.0	(21.3)	100.0	(100.0)
1970	58.1	(68.2)	10.7	(7.9)	31.2	(23.9)	100.0	(100.0)
Annual growth rate (percent)								
1950-60	2.5	(3.7)	2.7	(2.9)	4.7	(5.1)	3.1	(4.0)
1960-70	1.4	(1.5)	8.6	(8.2)	3.8	(3.6)	2.7	(2.4)
1950-70	1.9	(2.6)	5.6	(5.5)	4.3	(4.3)	2.9	(3.2)

^aIncludes extractive mining.

^bExcludes persons seeking employment for the first time.

Note: Figures in parentheses represent the North and Maranhão (SUDAM).

Source: IBGE, *Censo Demográfico*, 1950, 1960, and 1970.

Taken from Mahar, 1979

TABLE 2

SUDAM and SUDENE: Industrial Capital-to-Labor Ratios of New Projects
(1975 prices)

Sector	SUDAM (Cr\$ thousands)	SUDENE (Cr\$ thousands)	SUDAM/ SUDENE
Mining	1,802.0	149.3	12.07
Manufacturing			
Nonmetallic minerals	471.4	188.4	2.50
Metallurgy	488.4	330.4	1.48
Electronics	130.7	108.2	1.21
Transport equipment	160.0	99.4	1.61
Wood products	133.4	154.6	0.86
Furniture	153.1	63.4	2.41
Paper	160.0	186.9	0.86
Rubber	1,076.0	233.3	4.61
Leather	117.0	166.3	0.70
Chemicals	297.5	491.2	0.61
Pharmaceuticals	328.8	201.9	1.63
Perfumery	348.0	183.6	1.90
Plastics	375.6	156.6	2.40
Textiles	75.1	194.7	0.39
Apparel	237.5	42.2	5.63
Foods	322.6	111.9	2.88
Beverages	217.8	201.9	1.08
Tobacco	9.6	31.9	0.30
Miscellaneous	164.7	91.5	1.80
Subtotal	207.3	193.0	1.07
Total	260.3	192.2	1.35

Note: Projects approved through mid-1976.

Sources: D. E. Goodman and R. Cavalcanti de Albuquerque, *Incentivos à Industrialização e Desenvolvimento do Nordeste*, Coleção Relatórios de Pesquisa, no. 20 (Rio de Janeiro: IPEA/INPES, 1974), pp. 249-50; IPEA/SUDAM/NAEA survey, Taken from Mahar, 1979

Table 3

Partial Disaggregation of Factors Affecting Growth in Regional Income

	1950	1960	% RI	Growth	% of GRI	1970	% RI	Growth	% of GRI	1975
Regional Income	2,488,500	4,441,216				6,882,048				
Growth in Regional Income		1,952,716				2,440,832				
Government ¹	---	339,709	7.6	339,709	17.4	915,312	13.3	575,603	23.6	
Belem-Brasilia (per year) ²	---	274,360	6.1	274,360	14.0	---				
SUDAM/SUFRAMA (per year) ³	---	---				1,425,900	20.7	1,425,900	58.4	1,425,900
SPVEA (per year) ⁴	---	365,667	8.2	365,667	18.7	---				
Minerals (at census year) ⁵	---	34,712	.8	34,712	1.8	375,169	5.5	340,457	13.9	
Black Pepper (at census year) ⁶	---	42,366	1.0	42,366	2.1	101,835	1.5	59,469	2.4	234,472
PIN (incl. transamazon) (av/yr) ⁷	---	---				---				756,800
PROTERRA (average/year) ⁸	---	---				---				2,523,000
TOTALS		1,056,844	23.8	1,056,814	54.1	2,850,678	41.4	2,401,429	98.4	(incomplet

1975 values. Cr\$1000