


IS THERE A WAY TO TALK ABOUT MAKING CULTURE WITHOUT MAKING ENEMIES?

Jean Jackson



Introduction

This essay¹ discusses the difficulty encountered in our attempts to describe, in a non-offensive manner, how a given group of people invent, create, package, and sometimes sell their culture. It explores a way to think about these processes derived from pidgin-creole studies.

On-going research on an Indian rights movement in southeastern Colombia² has made me acutely aware of how difficult it can be to use neutral language in descriptions of how Indians are refashioning, rethinking, "inventing" their culture. Tukanoans (as the riverine inhabitants of the Vaupés are called), in particular members of CRIVA (Regional Council of Vaupés Indians), an ethnic federation promoting indigenous rights in the Vaupés region, are currently acquiring notions about Indianness from non-Tukanoans, both whites and Indians. It is hard not to sound judgmental when describing how Tukanoans are reconceiving what it means to be Indian as a result of input from outsiders. I have concluded that anthropology has provided us with very few neutral terms to describe the processes I am observing.

In a forthcoming essay, I discuss how the term *culture*, because of some of the underlying assumptions in its conventional meanings, is anything but useful when we try to describe how people with an indigenist awareness of themselves modify their culture as part of their inter-ethnic strategies. The topic is a tricky one because words like *culture*, whose assumptions can trip up anthropologists, are also used by members in movements promoting the preservation of "Indian

culture." At times, this can result in anthropologists and pro-Indian activists unwittingly colluding³ in misrepresenting what is actually going on. Anthropologists or activists⁴ often find it academically or politically expedient to use *culture* to describe continuities between the past and present, in cases warranting a more sophisticated analysis because such continuities may in fact exist only superficially, the underlying meanings being radically different.

It is by now clear that none of the meanings of *culture* is entirely apolitical or value-free. Most often "traditional culture" is seen as a good thing, something that should be safeguarded. But in order to be thought of as good, culture must not be seen as invented or created, except over a long period of time. For the most part, culture is usually not considered to be something constructed or modified by discrete individuals and groups. When this happens--an example would be the changes wrought by a messianic leader of a nativist movement--it becomes history, and culture is opposed to history in this respect. Small-scale tribal groups like Tukanoans, who are seen as still to some extent constituting a separate culture, are often considered to be "without history," as Cowlshaw and Wolf nicely put it.⁵ When we do speak of people as political actors who are changing culture, we run the risk of seeming to speak of them in negative terms, the implication being that the culture resulting from these operations is not really authentic.

Tribal Cultures and Ethnic Groups

Tukanoans, like many other tropical forest Indian groups, as they are increasingly incorporated into modern society while remaining distinctive, are moving from being a tribal "culture"

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to an ethnic group. An ethnic group is a recognizably distinct group of people substantially embedded in a larger society. As such, it is no longer to be thought of as a separate culture but more as a subculture, its inventory of distinct traits having been produced to a significant extent through interaction with other sectors of the society. While there have always been problems thinking of Tukanoans as a traditional tribal culture,⁶ present-day Tukanoans are clearly moving farther and farther away from this ideal type. Thus, to the degree that modern-day Amazonian Indian groups can and do choose to remain ethnically distinct as they are increasingly incorporated into modern society, their distinctiveness changes in its essential nature. Even if the content of their ethnicity -- the characteristics that make the group different from other sectors of society -- appears to be identical with cultural forms from earlier periods, most often the underlying meaning is so altered that we cannot say these forms are the same.⁷

In my paper on how conventional notions of culture impede understanding cases like the current Tukanoan one, I try to indicate that some of the inapplicable underlying assumptions about culture stem from a biological model that likens a culture to a species.⁸ Although they change as a response to changing environment and genetic mutation, species are never spoken of as inventing themselves. Hence, with a biological model underlying conventional notions of culture, individuals who actively and at times intentionally invent and modify their culture will tend to be seen as producing an inauthentic, ersatz culture. A proper account of what is currently going on in the Vaupés should not depict people possessing, losing, or acquiring culture, in the way a species possesses fur or claws, but in terms of creating and inventing it. Tukanoans are *not* being amalgamated or assimilated,⁹ and yet the cultural forms that are being retained are changing in meaning and purpose, rather radically in some instances. Fox's phrase, "culture in the making," captures this idea, as does Layne's "reconceiving culture."¹⁰ Clifford similarly

criticizes the tendency to speak of societies always in terms of either dying or surviving, assimilating or resisting.¹¹

Tukanoans are beginning to be instructed by outsiders, both whites and Indians, on what it means to be an Indian, even on what it means to be a tropical forest Indian. Hence, I have tried to stress both being and *becoming* an Indian,¹² and tried not to speak of Tukanoans as having been deprived, "without" culture. The title of the book *Ishi in Two Worlds: The Last Wild Indian in North America* gives the impression that there are no more "real" Indians in North America.¹³ Tukanoans are not "losing" one culture and "acquiring" another; why traditional forms are retained, modified or dropped is a complex question. For example, it has sometimes seemed to me that Tukanoans are not "maintaining" traditional cultural forms so much as appropriating them as a political strategy. As noted above, retention of traditional forms does not imply that they remain the same;¹⁴ apparent continuities can be surface continuities only. Tukanoan leaders in CRIVA seem to be taking a cure from certain other Indians and whites (politicized highland Indians, leftist priests, anthropologists, etc.) who are interested in promoting Indianness and trying to justify and revindicate Tukanoan identity. This may be the beginning of a process of mobilizing and adapting "traditional" ethnic identity in order to mediate increasing incorporation into, and in some regards lessen, exploitation and discrimination from the white world. But even the verb "to appropriate" can sound pejorative.

Examples of Negative Language

Many writers undoubtedly want to describe indigenous peoples in a fashion that grants them "agency, process and social practice,"¹⁵ without having to use Machiavellian language. A number of writers on ethnicity seem to be grappling with -- consciously or willy nilly -- this issue. Examples of negative language in the literature on ethnicity, even when the author is not necessarily making such a value judgment, are easily found.

Most authors writing about ethnic groups agree that ethnicity is "an ascriptive element denoting the fact that certain people are defined, or define themselves, as belonging together by virtue of their presumed origin."¹⁶ "Presumed" is intended to raise doubts. Similarly, Barth speaks of a person's most basic identity "*presumptively* determined by his origin and background," and Cohen's use of the word "putative," when speaking of permanent, ascriptive identity features, is another instance.¹⁷ Vincent states that "ethnic ties are not primordial ties -- the assumed givens of a society, and their actual realized organization in any situation have to be demonstrated."¹⁸ The notion that one cannot take a group's word for it, but that primordial ties must be demonstrated through other means, is clear.¹⁹ Kahn speaks of ethnicity as an ideology that needs to be explained rather than a given, and Bourgois describes ethnicity as "a form of ideological expression."²⁰ The word "ideology" in both quotes can carry a negative connotation. Cohen speaks of "rationalization" and "creating": "Once the ethnic identities and categories are triggered into being salient, cultural rationalizations for the legitimacy of the mobilized grouping are actively sought for and created by those involved."²¹ He argues that ethnicity can "be narrowed or broadened in boundary terms, in relation to the specific needs of political mobilization."²² Vincent suggests that people will manipulate a classificatory system according to needs of the moment: "political actors . . . when articulating ethnic status, are able to define and redefine the rules of interaction according to their changing interests;"²³ ethnicity is not "a mystic force in itself" but "a tool in the hands of men."²⁴

Even Wolf's admirable notion of a culture as "a series of processes that construct, reconstruct, and dismantle cultural materials, in response to identifiable determinants"²⁵ under some circumstances might invite an angry response from the people described as "constructing" their culture.²⁶ They might see it as another example of the expert social scientists demonstrating that *they* know better or an example of how social scientists

are lackeys of the establishment, fighting on its side in the media and in the courts. Ethnic groups who are making various claims about themselves and what they are entitled to have resented the seemingly hostile treatment from anthropologists who label their justifications for their claims as ideology and manipulation. Of course, sometimes anthropologists *are* arguing against such claims. But I am talking about situations when an anthropologist is primarily concerned with description and analysis.

One response is to say that analysis and advocacy are different enterprises, even when engaged in by the same person, and that disappointing one's natives is an occupational hazard of being an anthropologist.²⁷ Clearly, at times what the natives would like you to say and what you feel you must say will be at odds and there will be no reconciliation; anthropology has been and will continue to be, on occasion, a highly politicized discourse. But I am talking about anthropologists who want to describe a social and cultural process accurately and who want to find non-negative language with which to do it. I, perhaps naively, believe that with a little creating and inventing of our own, we can come up with models and metaphors describing indigenous responses that are acceptable to them, at least to some of them some of the time.²⁸

CRIVA

Interviews I had with some CRIVA members and various documents CRIVA has written, provided examples of Tukanoan self-representations being influenced by outside notions of what an authentic tropical forest Indian is. I cannot place CRIVA in its proper context here. To adequately comprehend the current Tukanoan situation requires background knowledge about the local Vaupés scene and the people elsewhere in Colombia who create the legislation and make the policies that affect the region's inhabitants. One must also know about the history of land reform and Indian-white struggles elsewhere in the country. CRIVA was founded in 1973 with the

backing of the *Prefectura Apostólica del Vaupés*, the Catholic mission headquarters in Mitú, the capital of the region. ONIC (National Organization of Colombian Indians), and some of its member organizations, in particular CRIC (Regional Council of Cauca Indians), have greatly influenced CRIVA. Although relatively few white residents live outside Mitú, a town of some 6,000 inhabitants, *colonos* (homesteaders) and other whites (for example, the owners of *almacenes*, or general stores), also play an important role.

CRIVA has had a multitude of problems. The vast majority of Tukanoans are substantially less politicized than active CRIVA members, and many Tukanoans are indifferent or hostile to it. Tukanoans living far from Mitú are not, for the most part, actively involved in the organization, and many apparently do not respect the leaders or the positions they espouse. We can say that most Tukanoans are less self-consciously indigenist than active CRIVA members, and of those Tukanoans who are interested in indigenous rights organizing, some are not sure that CRIVA best represents their interests in situations of Indian-white conflict. Thus, CRIVA members do not typify Tukanoans in general. They may represent the Tukanoan of tomorrow, or they may not -- the region is changing so rapidly it is hard to predict what the future will look like.

A summary of reasons why CRIVA is so weak is necessary for understanding its cadet position vis à vis non-Tukanoan individuals and organizations. The main factors are 1) no urgent threat to Tukanoan lands or other natural resources that could unite most Tukanoans against it; 2) over-dependence on non-Tukanoans; 3) internal divisiveness; 4) the effects of coca paste trafficking; and 5) co-optation and marginalization of members, resulting in their losing legitimacy in the eyes of their constituents.

In the 70's, the Colombian government instituted wide-ranging legislation affecting Indians that included regularization of Indian land claims into reserves (*reservas*) and preserves (*resguardos*). A reserve is land owned by the state with usufruct rights given to the inhabitants, and

resguardo implies collective ownership of land by the Indian group. A *resguardo* of some 3,000,000 hectares was established in the Vaupés. That so much territory has been ceded to so few Indians, with virtually no pressure coming from the Indians themselves is indeed remarkable. It reflects an extremely unstable national political situation²⁹ and a policy implemented by a fundamentally weak national government that attempts to win hearts and minds in the countryside and thus prevent leftist guerrilla groups from gaining more converts. During this time, Indian organizing, with the participation of international indigenous rights organizations, led to the establishment of many pro-Indian organizations, and a great deal of discussion about Colombian Indians, their current status and probable future, in the national press.

With respect to the second factor, over-dependence on non-Tukanoans, CRIVA has been treated paternalistically by virtually all the outsiders it has interacted with. The role of outsiders working with local Tukanoan leaders -- priests, government agents, anthropologists, representatives of national and international Indian rights organizations, lawyers promoting civil and human rights legislation, etc. -- is extremely complex. These various interest groups have divergent goals, and while many sincerely want what is best for Tukanoans, one result of so many outsiders playing a role in the formation and evolution of CRIVA has been CRIVA's inability to grow up. One interviewee in Bogotá commented that activist Indians who visit the Vaupés say:

'... we're going to work with the *gente de base* (the people of the base communities).' But they're bureaucrats, they speak Spanish, they manage the white world. Now, it's true the local people may have to learn to manage the white world, but they must do so for their *own* interests.

And a priest commented that the Church should change its position regarding CRIVA:

The Church has to leave CRIVA alone, so that it can mature, not be dependent. When a child falls down, you

have to give him a hand up, but sometimes they to pick themselves up.

Another factor is the problem of internal divisiveness. The Church, which played a decisive role in creating CRIVA, bears some responsibility for this, due to its divide-and-conquer tactics employed over the years in struggles against its evangelical Protestant rivals.³⁰

In the late 70's, many Tukanoans quickly acquired large amounts of cash and trade goods through coca. To some extent, the rapid change and easy cash that coca trafficking brought to the region resulted in many Tukanoans feeling even less militant about protecting their land and customs, and even more inclined to interact with the white world than before. Various interviewees commented that Tukanoan indigenist organizing was as much a response to coca as anything else.

One subgroup of CRIVA was described as little more than a coca-growers' guild, concerned with regulating prices, the amount of land whites could cultivate, and the amount of *mordida*, or payoff, to local (and sometimes federal) authorities.

Finally, participating in ethnic federations like CRIVA can bring about a degree of bureaucratization, co-optation, and marginalization of leaders vis-à-vis more traditional sectors. This process has put CRIVA members in a bind: the more efficient and effective they become at garnering goodies offered by the system, the more suspect and illegitimate they become to their constituencies.

Various non-Indian interest groups in the Vaupés have recently been finding it useful to pay attention and even promote traditional Tukanoan culture. Quite a number of individuals I interviewed criticized CRIVA for not being traditional *enough*, saying it was too caught up in the white world and did not care enough about preserving Tukanoan culture or developing genuine grass-roots activism. The reverse would have been the case twenty years ago. This is probably less due to these individuals' having recently acquired respect for lifeways different from their own than to concerns about coca paste trafficking, possible

alliances between guerrillas and Tukanoans, and the inability of Church and government change agents in the region to develop the region in a manner that would benefit from Tukanoans changing into a proletariat sector. Thus, while twenty years ago whites spoke of teaching Tukanoans about the dignity of work and the value of saving money, a number of whites today seem to feel that Tukanoans face grave dangers by acculturating too rapidly. We thus have various whites -- individuals and organizations -- who are interested in preserving and defining what "traditional" Tukanoan culture is all about.

Outsider Indians are defining what traditional Tukanoan culture is as well. These definitions are sometimes incorrect: a book published by a Tukanoan with the backing of the Prefecture (*Fundamental Principles of CRIVA*, by Jesús Santacruz),³¹ reveals any number of inaccuracies about Tukanoan ethnography, and so do descriptions of Tukanoans in the newspaper of the national Indian organization, *Unidad Indígena*. These, I would argue, are not random inaccuracies, but reveal a systemic bias towards fitting Tukanoans into a generalized, romanticized picture of tropical forest Indians. Characteristics and traits attributed to Tukanoans are of the kind to provide strong arguments in any future conflicts over land rights, local political autonomy, labor organizing, and so forth. Of course, this process has occurred in the Western Hemisphere repeatedly over the last two centuries, involving many Indian groups. What is interesting about the Vaupés case is that we are witnessing the beginning stages.

Indigenism with a Capital "I"

This paper's introduction refers to the process of "becoming an Indian." We have seen that recently a new message has appeared in whites' (and non-Tukanoan Indians') heralding the desirability of Tukanoans remaining the way they are in some important respects. But remaining the way they are nevertheless involves significant change on the part of the Tukanoans, paradoxical

though it may seem, because definitions of who they are increasingly originate in their expanding interaction with non-Tukanoans.

We have seen that Tukanoans who are influenced by the national Indian rights movement are hearing and incorporating into their self-image several notions foreign to their traditional understandings of themselves in their society. CRIVA faces a dilemma: part of its mission is to represent tropical-forest Indians to an outside world, but since it occupies a marginal and relatively powerless status in Mitú and within the national Indian movement, its self-representations contain non-trivial elements received from outsiders. Although to some extent Tukanoans are seen as more authentically Indian, because of CRIVA's relative lack of political savvy within ONIC, communicating about such authenticity is clearly not always entrusted to Tukanoans. CRIVA leaders may in the future develop the political clout and organizational savoir-faire that allow them more ideological hegemony vis-à-vis outsiders. But the dilemma they face is that when traditional political forms and expectations differ extensively from new, intrusive ones, the members of an activist group can experience the conflict and confusion resulting from fence-straddling and the marginality of biculturalism. Tukanoans, coming out of relatively fluid, dispersed local communities, have little experience with centralized political structures and their bureaucracies. The means for achieving an active role in deciding their own destinies, making collective decisions, and learning to negotiate with outside groups is not a part of the traditional Tukanoan political repertoire.³² It is thus no surprise that foreign notions about Indian identity and culture are influencing current Tukanoan self-representations.

As noted above, traditional cultural forms that are retained are not necessarily the same if their meaning has changed. This might seem so obvious as to not warrant comment, but such a point is often forgotten because anthropologists and indigenists alike are often interested in discovering the connections between current traditions and earlier ones. For example, if a ritual

evolves from something Tukanoans do entirely for one another to something they do for outsiders, or if Tukanoans perform a ritual for themselves because it fosters a self-image that has been inspired by outsiders, then despite superficial similarities between traditional rituals and these new ones, they are not traditional in some important respects. Rather, the various ritual forms and underlying meanings stand in a dialogical relationship with one another.

How to describe this with our conventional notions of culture? We can speak of a ritual having been folkloricized when it occurs because the participants' involvement in the larger society significantly influences why the ritual is performed and why particular traditional ritual forms have been retained. As Tukanoans are increasingly embedded in Colombian culture and society, they are increasingly coming to define themselves in terms of the larger society, even though this definition is not the simple one of "how fast are we amalgamating?" I have argued that we are seeing the very beginnings of a process of folkloricization of some aspects of culture among the more acculturated Tukanoans who participate in the local indigenous rights movement, who are finding out what it means to be Tukanoan in a new way, one different from the way Tukanoans revised their self-concepts over the past two centuries in interaction with whites.³³ Young Tukanoans who reside in Mitú and its environs not only are learning from outsiders how to be Indian, but also to some extent how to be Tukanoan. The pages of CRIVA's newspaper, *La Voz de la Tribu*, that describe Tukanoan traditions in ethnographically incorrect fashion are a harbinger of a transformed Tukanoan identity. But "folkloricization" is a negative term for describing this process, and I would prefer to limit its use to instances of state-imposed maintenance of cultural forms.³⁴ But the element of self-consciousness is a crucial one, and I have no other term to offer.

An important change occurs when, because a vastly more powerful cultural system is making significant inroads into an indigenous culture, the members of that culture become aware of

themselves as a *culture* -- here contrasted to being aware of themselves as a distinct *people*, which I would maintain is how indigenous cultures conceive of the differences between themselves and their neighbors in pre-contact situations. A further refinement, a distinction difficult to characterize, is that while to some extent indigenism begins with the very first contact with a radically different culture, Indigenism -- indigenism with a capital "I," self-conscious indigenism, along with self-conscious culture -- begins when a group of people begin to appropriate notions of who they are *from* the intrusive dominant culture, albeit in contradiction to it.³⁵ This is now occurring in the Vaupés. Folkloricized, or self-conscious ritual (or culture) is ritual whose meaning is derived in part from the fact that the audience (both the audience which is physically present and the audience in people's minds) includes people from different cultures. The same point can be made about "authentic" North American Indian handiwork intended primarily for the non-Indian market: to a large extent it is the market and the federal government, not the Indians, which determines standards of authenticity and excellence.³⁶ No Tukanoan spoke of *nuestra cultura* ("our culture") in the late '60s in this self-conscious sense, although at that time many complained bitterly about whites. But they are now beginning to speak in this fashion.

But how to talk about this transformation, whether of a ritual or of Indian culture in general, in other deprecatory terms? Simply to talk of "becoming an Indian" suggests something inauthentic, insincere, as does the word "folkloricize." I do not want to give the impression that I am judging some cultural traits as better than others simply because they are traditional. I do believe there are criteria with which to make such judgments, but they have to do with the effects of such preserved or new traits on the well-being of the group in question -- and sometimes this is difficult to assess, even in hindsight.

One reason why so many negative words are used in descriptions of culture change is that anthropologists -- both as scholars and activists --

mourn the loss of indigenous cultures and languages. When we give a particular native people high marks for surviving and adapting by adopting cultural forms from outsiders, we nonetheless regret what they lose. Furthermore, we know of cases where later generations also regret such losses, to the extent of going to the library and reading earlier anthropological monographs about their ancestors. Anthropologists -- both those who have carried out scholarly research in Vaupés and those involved in more activist enterprises there -- no less than others involved, have opinions about what is good and bad about Tukanoan traditional cultural forms and the intrusive values and behaviors from Colombian society. To put it bluntly, we may not like *at all* how Tukanoans are choosing to adapt to their new conditions. We may see the new patterns of thought and action as counterfeit, less aesthetic, less nutritious, as posing a danger to long-term chances for self-sufficiency, autonomy, empowerment, and so forth. And we may be right. I would argue that anthropologists must be moral persons in their profession and that they must recognize that no ethnographic practice, however objective in methodology, is ever value-free. But I would also argue that indigenous peoples have the right to choose non-nutritious, non-beautiful or non-"authentic" cultural forms as much as we have a right to deplore them. And that insofar as we are trying to objectively describe choices being made by Tukanoans (or others), describing them with a notion of culture that is deeply conservative³⁷ may impede us in these efforts.

Creole-Pidgins

We are now ready to consider how pidgin-creole studies might help us talk about Tukanoan culture in a non-pejorative manner. Pidgins are languages which arise to fulfill certain restricted communication needs among people who have no common language.³⁸ If they become the first language of a group of people, then they are considered to be creoles. One cannot think of pidgin-creoles in static terms; they arise in

situations of great turbulence, and a particular pidgin-creole's rate of change may vary greatly over time. We can think of pidgin-creoles as continuously being constructed and reconstructed by their users. Pidgin-creoles always arise in the context of the state, most often in colonial and neo-colonial situations. The inventors of pidgin-creoles are "victims in the long process of domination and exploitation which has marked much of Europe's contact with the rest of the world during the past five centuries."³⁹ Until recently, pidgin-creoles were seen as inferior, broken dialects of well-established languages. Some scholars still occasionally use stigmatizing language when describing pidgin-creoles; for example, Whinnom describes pidgins as "defective" languages, with "inferior" flexibility and adaptability.⁴⁰ But he does note that creoles, with their generic plasticity, appear to repair many of the deficiencies inherited from their parent pidgin. Most other authors, while at times struggling to find neutral words to describe how pidgins are limited, reduced, etc., are quite clear that neither pidgins nor creoles are broken, bastardized, formless "dialects." They also point out that these languages have a lot to teach us about "the nature of human interaction through language, and about man's innate communicative competence."⁴¹

For the most part, non-linguists still see pidgin-creoles in extremely negative terms. Most educators in Jamaica, for example, do not recognize Jamaican Creole as a language, but treat speakers as though they were speaking English carelessly and slovenly. In the 1950s, the linguist Le Page was savagely attacked by a Jamaican newspaper columnist who warned that his studies of Jamaican Creole could undermine all Jamaican education by encouraging teachers to tolerate the use of creole in the schools.⁴²

Pidgins arise in situations demanding communication around a limited number of topics. Very specialized and constricted at the initial points, if they survive, as they gain speakers and evolve into creoles, they rapidly expand. This process means that pidgin-creoles, when analyzed

over time, are revealed to be extremely dynamic and generative linguistic systems.

Pidgin-creoles, once created, have a backwards and forwards motion. Not only do they evolve, but speakers also call on them when speaking the other languages in their repertoires, back-translating into these languages. The effect on these other local languages can be significant. For example, a metaphor in pidgin that is incorporated into another language can introduce a new concept. In *Tok pisin* (New Guinea pidgin), *cutimskin* is a metaphor for "gossip" -- similar to our notion of "taking a swipe at someone." When this was backtranslated into Kaluli, the literal translation introduced a new way of talking about things; the metaphorical aspect was lost. Furthermore, when pidgin words are back-translated, they sometimes replace terms in the other language, or genericize a meaning. An introduced word can stand as a cover term for something that may have four or five terms in the language. Pidgin-creoles, thus, are part of a back and forth movement among the other languages they are interacting with: the direction of causality is not only one way.⁴³

Another feature of pidgin-creoles is that in most places where they exist there is clearly a distinct register for speaking with outsiders, a reduced pidgin. In *Tok pisin* it is called *tok masta*. One hears this register in shops -- it is the "encounter" register. And it is recognized locally as a reduced version of the pidgin. Furthermore, in New Guinea *tok masta* is recognized as the version that is closest to English. When people talk in this register, they talk louder, more slowly, and with very un-pidgin markers. They will say of someone, "he only understands *tok masta*." This means that outsiders will have difficulties discerning the complexity of pidgin-creoles if their interactions with native speakers are always of the encounter type -- which is most often the case. The complexity of markers of occasion and situation are masked. For example, DeCamp, discussing Chinese pidgin, notes that "foreigners who claim to speak a pidgin-creole rarely do . . . it is more likely only a baby-talk English larded with bits of Chinese

and real pidgin.⁴⁴ He notes that the real speakers treat these attempts with contempt.

Several analogies can be drawn between pidgin-creole studies and situations involving "inventing" culture. To begin with, a point made above was that pidgin-creoles are constructed and *reconstructed* by users. Pidgin-creoles are adaptive and resourceful languages in the process of acquiring and retaining native speakers. Bakhtin's discussion of dialogical interaction, the iterative process of receiving and reconceptualizing, of continual shaping and re-shaping of a word, discourse, language or culture, is apt:

... [a word] enters a dialogically agitated and tension-filled environment of alien words, value judgments, and accents, weaves in and out of complex interrelationships, merges with some, recoils from others, intersects with yet a third group.⁴⁵

Linguists encounter difficulties classifying pidgin-creoles because they change so rapidly and because of disagreements over the criteria for declaring whether a given pidgin has evolved into a creole or not -- some say this occurs when children grow up speaking a pidgin as their native language, whereas others require structural features to be present which some pidgin-creoles, although they have acquired native speakers, do not possess. Bickerton notes that "the babies do not wait" for certain criteria to be met before they acquire a pidgin as a first language.⁴⁶ Cultures, like pidgin-creoles, are also dynamic, and analogous classificatory problems can be found in anthropological practice as well, although they are often swept under the rug. For example, Cohen notes that the "fieldwork greats . . . knew they were often as not creating arbitrary and artificial boundaries" when describing indeterminate and shifting groups as separate cultures.⁴⁷

Second, in pidgin-creoles studies we are constantly reminded that it is the *speakers* who are constructing the pidgin-creole and altering the other languages in their repertoires in response to the pidgin-creole. With pidgin-creoles it is more

difficult to over-privilege the languages; the emphasis is, appropriately, on the actors creating solutions. For example, DeCamp, discussing the pidgin Juba Arabic, shows how its restricted vocabulary is supplemented, whenever the need arises, by speakers using words from various native languages or normal Arabic.⁴⁸ As Todd notes, the very nature of pidgin-creoles' structure and lexical resources "compels attention to the social and cultural circumstances of their origin, transmission and persistence."⁴⁹ We are similarly at times tempted to overly focus on and reify culture, downplaying the actors and their motives for adapting themselves to changing social conditions. Just as people create pidgins because they are actively searching for solutions to particular circumstances, so are Tukanoans when engaged in their enterprise of creating culture. The neutral language used to describe how speakers of Juba Arabic create language should inspire us to find ways to similarly describe people inventing culture.

Traugott, commenting on how pidgin-creoles challenged many traditional concepts in comparative linguistics and historical reconstruction, notes that pidginization and creolization

... present a formidable challenge to the genetic view of historical linguistics. First and foremost, pidginization and creolization, however defined, involve the development of new languages out of convergent contact situations . . . Equally problematic was the fact that pidgins are known to develop rapidly . . . this suggests that basic vocabulary can be altered and realtered within a very short period of time.⁵⁰

Pidgin-creoles have a variable rate of change. Pidgins can be relexified and repidginized. Thus, pidgin-creoles are changing all the time, and not necessarily in a single direction. It is our organic notion of culture that impedes us from seeing culture in similar fashion, that leads us to think in terms of possession, in terms of quantity retained versus lost, in terms of continuity versus dispersal. A genetic model common to both anthropology

and historical linguistics does not provide an adequate language for talking about such processes. If pidgin-creoles can help us understand something about how to see present-day Tukanoan culture, surely it is that seeing culture as something static, primordial, and handed down from earlier generations, period, must be abandoned.

Of course, culture change has always been seen as more susceptible to variable rates of change than some views of language change (e.g., the assumptions of glottochronology). While anthropologists have accepted the notion of culture *contact* and diffusion for decades, speaking of syncretization and acculturation, the underlying notion of culture remains one based on an organic model where cultures either survive, die, or are assimilated. The organic model of either a language or a culture is, in the last analysis, inimical to the dialogic notion of "the constant interaction between meanings, all of which have the potential of conditioning others,"⁵¹ which I am suggesting is the way to see what is happening in the Vaupés. Cultures, like nations,⁵² are not "natural": "... an essence that has been fixed by natural processes and it cannot change ... without becoming something else, some other thing."⁵³ However, we must bear in mind that, given the roles ethnic groups play in modern society in inter-ethnic and ethnic-state interactions, cultures will tend to be spoken of as natural and as something possessed.

The lesson to be learned from the reduced "encounter" versions of many pidgins is that since outsiders will be most likely to come into contact with a significantly reduced version of the language, they will be misled into thinking they understand it far more than they do -- because it is simplified, and because these encounter versions resemble the superstrate language more than any other versions. Whinnom describes how, when speaking to English speakers, speakers of Chinese pidgin will "adopt precisely the same measures as in the alleged behavior of master to slave, i.e., they speak slowly and distinctly, repeat carefully phrases ..."⁵⁴ It is difficult to penetrate into the

complexity of Chinese pidgin; English speakers tend to come away from the encounters with their stereotypes intact. A parallel perhaps will occur in the Vaupés where outsiders, including anthropologists, may see only simplified versions of new Tukanoan cultural forms, versions targeted at outsiders, "for public consumption."

The new Tukanoan cultural forms are, like pidgin-creoles, being forged in a situation of social and ethnic turbulence. Tukanoans are finding ways to communicate about themselves in often stressful situations which they do not totally understand. They are learning some elements of these new cultural forms from outsiders. As noted above, the basic act of forming a group like CRIVA, with its bureaucracy and mission, is foreign to traditional Tukanoan lifeways. A lawyer in Bogotá involved in Indian land claims cases complained about CRIVA's lack of authenticity, saying its leaders:

... are waiting for those in power to do something -- now it's waiting for a response from the government, tomorrow waiting for an investigator to give them money. It's not an *Indian* organization at all. Like most Indian organizations, it is conceived and made rational with the rationality of the white.

Another similarity is the presence of stigma. Linguists point out that there is no such thing as a primitive or inferior language.⁵⁵ And yet pidgin-creoles are marginal "in the circumstances of their origin, and in the attitudes towards them on the part of those who speak one of the languages from which they derive."⁵⁶ A parallel can be drawn with the Tukanoan case. Although both whites and non-Tukanoan Indians are currently celebrating some aspects of traditional Tukanoan culture: longhouses, rituals, and artifacts are spoken of favorably, evidence is also abundant that whites, Tukanoans, and non-Tukanoan Indians continue to see Indianness, especially tropical-forest Indianness, as inferior. In some pidgin-creole situations a "hyper-creolization" is encountered, which is most often a nationalistic reaction against the oppressive corrective pressures from the

standard language, an "aggressive assertion of linguistic discreteness and superior status for creole."⁵⁷ Hyperforms in languages are mistaken insofar as speakers believe an incorrect form is the correct one.⁵⁸ An example of a now-accepted English hyperform is the use of "premises" to mean real estate; another hyperform, pronouncing the "t" in *often*, may eventually become the accepted pronunciation. It may be useful to see some of the emerging notions about tropical-forest Indianness in this manner. Insofar as CRIVA publications describe Tukanoan lifeways in an ethnographically incorrect manner, in order to fit them to received ideas of what being a proper Indian is, the analogy with the hyper-creolization process is apt. For example, an article in *Unidad Indígena* describes the Vaupés language groups:

To each tribe corresponds a territory whose limits are clearly recognized and respected; in keeping with tradition and mythology, this territory is communal property of the entire tribe.⁵⁹

In actuality, an association between land and language group in the Vaupés exists in an idealized, symbolic sense only; nor is there any idea that certain clearly demarcated parcels of land belong to one language group exclusively.⁶⁰ Local settlements are often intermingled with respect to language group affiliation, and often a settlement's closest neighbors belong to other language groups. Another article in *Unidad Indígena* asserts that land is worked communally, another (current) ethnographic inaccuracy. It is no accident that the generalized image of traditional Indian culture being introduced to the Vaupés contains notions of communal ownership of land and communal labor; to be able to assert tribal communal ownership of clearly demarcated lands is to have a strong arguing position in potential future battles over land rights. If all Tukanoans eventually come to believe these received notions about themselves, we will have a situation analogous to the linguistic situation where a hyperform becomes the correct form, with only language historians knowing its origin in a

misperception. The "hyperforms" in Tukanoan culture -- incorrect notions received from outsiders -- are being made the correct notions, insofar as we are paying attention to Tukanoan self-representations, rather than current Tukanoan ethnographic reality. Tukanoans adopting new notions about communal land and labor are responding to stigmatized visions of Tukanoan culture by creating an image of (hyper-) Indianness distinct from and morally superior to white culture. On the one hand, clearly at one period in time some Tukanoans are making incorrect assertions about their traditional communal land and labor customs, just as the original Kaluli speakers who back-translated *cutimskin* from *tok pisin* were not speaking "correct" Kaluli. But in the final analysis, it is the actors who create linguistic or ethnographic reality; ethnicity or culture is not some mystical force existing apart from them, even though we (and they) often speak as though this were the case. In this instance, there is a tension between two kinds of accuracies. Our difficulties arise when we over-privilege historical accuracy because of a view of culture and ethnicity as essential and timeless.⁶¹

Conclusion

We are seeing the beginnings of a process of folkloricization of various Tukanoan cultural traits. Perhaps in the future we shall see the commoditization of them. Elsewhere in the hemisphere various interest groups, including indigenous groups themselves, package and promote "Indianness."⁶² The cultural forms that are retained from earlier traditions can therefore totally change in meaning. This poses problems when we talk about cultures using an organic model, because we find we cannot describe these processes in other than negative language. Both anthropologists and pro-Indian activists at times find it academically and/or politically expedient to talk of culture as enduring over time: while changing, these cultures are nonetheless seen as remaining the same in some fundamental ways. But when, as is beginning to occur in the

Tukanoan case, traits are retained, cast aside or redefined as part of a self-conscious awareness and promotion of a particular kind of Indian identity as a political strategy, the meaning of these traits has often radically changed. We cannot use a quasi-biological model to account for these similarities over time.

Since resemblances between earlier forms of Tukanoan culture and later forms may be superficial, conceiving of a culture in terms of traits that persist over time can be misleading. We need to think of culture change over relatively short periods of time in a more dynamic fashion, rather than as either the "same" or "syncretized" or "lost." We need to see Tukanoans and others as creating and improvising, rather than possessing, culture. And we need to create and invent models and metaphors that analyze this process in non-derogatory terms.

Some of the ways in which Tukanoans, over the last twenty years, in some respects have come to represent "authentic" Indians who possess moral superiority have been described. However, Tukanoan culture, like Indian culture in general, will also continue to be seen pejoratively -- as backward, foreign, "savage." Tukanoans will respond to these contradictory and ambivalent evaluations and will dialogically derive new self-representations in creative, unforeseen ways. Outsiders will not necessarily be privy to the process of creating these new meanings and may misinterpret some aspects of the new Tukanoan self-representations because they will sometimes be encountering only the *tok masta* version of the culture Tukanoans are inventing, the part for public consumption. But because these outsiders -- priests, highland Indians, anthropologists, etc. -- have their own axes to grind about which cultural forms should be valorized and which are better left where they fell by the wayside, and because interactions between Tukanoans and these outsiders occur in conditions of asymmetrical power relations, these outsiders will have played an important role in the creation of any new representations of Tukanoan identity. Our analytical language makes it difficult to describe

these processes without using negative, value-laden words, even when we especially wish to sound as neutral, descriptive, and objective as possible.

In Colombia, discussion of Indian culture and identity occurs daily. Present-day Indians are becoming part of Colombia's national heritage, just as the historical Andean Indian groups have been for decades. But the pre-Colombian Indians are dead and have no say in determining how their culture and identity are fashioned by the dominant ideology. Tukanoans, on the other hand, and other living Indians, assume an active role in this process. Regardless of the motives of those in the metropole -- to somewhat paradoxically create unifying symbols of pluralism, avoid guerrilla-Indian alliances, promote tourism, win votes -- Tukanoans and non-Tukanoans are locked together in this ongoing act of creation. We are witnessing the beginnings of a self-conscious indigenism, wherein Tukanoans' vision of themselves as Indian is generated out of their fundamental embeddedness in the larger society. Tukanoans in Mitú witnessed bare-breasted Tukanoan women dancing in a celebration of Mitú's fiftieth anniversary in 1986, even though women have covered their breasts in ceremonies and everyday life for a number of years. Or they can visit a cultural center in Mitú whose goal in part is to recreate the traditional longhouse and the artifacts it contains. The structure and the artifacts are to some extent "authentic," but the notion of a longhouse built for this purpose is utterly foreign. Tukanoans also see artifacts on the walls of rooms in the Prefecture and other public buildings in Mitú, and they themselves manufacture replicas for sale to tourists. Insofar as Tukanoans -- rather than Catholic missionaries -- come to control these activities, they will be validating their past with a form appropriated from the dominant culture. As such, the meaning of the architecture, the artisanal skills, the dances, etc., will have radically changed. Tukanoans are appropriating new, politicized and folkloricized frameworks, such as CRIVA's newspaper and the culture center, as a means of expressing their cultural identity.

Hence, we can see Tukanoans beginning the process of coming to see themselves as "having" a culture. They are learning how to think of themselves in this fashion with input from both whites and other Indians. Newly introduced notions of Tukanoan culture, such as the Mitú cultural center, are perhaps a very preliminary example of Handler's discussion of how nationalist ideologies prove the existence of the nation through possession of a culture.⁶³

This essay is about how the meaning of Tukanoan culture and identity is constantly being rethought, reshaped, and negotiated. Meaning is often spoken of in anthropology in overly static terms. For example, Geertz speaks of cultural man as "an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun." As Mattingly notes, this is an image of meaning as something contained and held.⁶⁴ Pidgin-creole languages offer a useful way, similar to Bakhtin's notion of dialogics, to see culture and identity as something in flux, something negotiated and grasped for, as opposed to acquired and possessed.

Tukanoans are beginning to formulate self-representations in a process similar to other Indians elsewhere on the two continents.⁶⁵ This

process, of course, happens in non-Indian contexts, as well. The ambivalence towards Tukanoans as representatives of tropical-forest Indians is analogous to how Bedouin symbols are used in the Jordan valley⁶⁶ or images of traditional villagers in Japan.⁶⁷ What we need is a more creative language that neither overly romanticizes nor denigrates this process.

This essay has suggested looking at pidgin-creole studies for inspiration. Pidgin-creoles were earlier seen as "barbarous dialects," disdained by laymen and linguists alike. Only recently have linguists begun to speak of this stepchild as a potential Cinderella for linguistic theory.⁶⁸ The study of "inauthentic," "public," "created" culture is now being upgraded, if the amount of articles and books is any indication.⁶⁹ Perhaps analogous to the contributions pidgin-creoles have made to linguistic theory, we may see an equivalent contribution to anthropological theories about culture from understanding "inauthentic" cultural forms like the Tukanoan examples discussed in this essay. If we are forced to find new ways to talk about situations like the one emerging among Tukanoans, we may find our theory and method much enhanced.

NOTES

1. This essay stems from a current research project concerned with changing identity among Tukanoans of Colombia.
2. Sources for this paper include twenty-two formal interviews conducted in Colombia during March 1987. I also engaged in a number of informal conversations with native leaders, change agents, and residents (both Tukanoan and white) of Mitú, the capital of the Vaupés, and with individuals in Bogotá who are knowledgeable about Colombian indigenous rights organizing and development efforts among Colombian Indian groups. Continuing archival work in the Vaupés and Bogotá, and dissertation fieldwork in 1968-70, have provided other information.
3. See Cohen's discussion of how anthropologists, as well as ethnic groups have vested interests in asserting the existence of boundaries in cases where boundaries are rather indistinct and permeable, and of "stable internal constitutions" in rather fluid social formations (1978). This debate has a long history in anthropology. See, D. Hymes, "Linguistic problems in defining the concept of 'tribe,'" in J. Helm, ed., *Essays on the Problem of Tribe* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1968), pp. 23-48; F. Barth, ed., *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1969), and Barth's Introduction; M. Fried, *The Notion of Tribe* (Menlo Park: Cummings, 1975); E. Wolf, "Inventing society," *American Ethnologist* (1988), Vol. 15, No. 4, pp. 752-761. Analyses of shifting and/or multiple

- memberships serve neither the needs of an overly scientific anthropology nor a group demonstrating its right to exist or to obtain some sort of benefit vis-à-vis the state.
4. Of course, anthropologists and advocates of the native people's position can be one and the same person. See, R. Wright, "Anthropological presuppositions of indigenous advocacy," *Annual Review of Anthropology* (1988), Vol. 17, pp. 365-390.
 5. G. Cowlshaw, "Colour, culture and the Aboriginalists," *Man* (1987), Vol. 22, No. 2, pp. 221-237; E. Wolf, *Europe and the People Without History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982).
 6. J. Jackson, *The Fish People: Linguistic Exogamy and Tukanoan Identity in Northwest Amazonia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
 7. See Barth, *op cit.* (1969).
 8. J. Jackson, "Changing Tukanoan ethnicity and the concept of culture. Paper given at Wenner-Gren symposium on "Amazonian synthesis: an integration of disciplines, paradigms, and methodologies." Novo Friburgo, Brazil, June 1989. See L. Layne, "The dialogics of tribal self-representation in Jordan," *American Ethnologist* (1989), Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 24-39; 25, for a similar discussion of the "organic" model of tribe. Also see J. Clifford, *The Predicament of Culture: Twentieth-Century Ethnography, Literature, and Art* (Cambridge: Harvard, 1988), pp. 60, 337-339, on assuming culture is a "natural" or organic entity.
 9. See M. Fischer, "Ethnicity and the post-modern arts of memory, in J. Clifford and G. Marcus, eds., *Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), pp. 194-233.
 10. R. Fox, *Lions of the Punjab: Culture in the Making* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); Layne, *op cit.* 1989.
 11. Clifford, *op cit.* (1988), p. 342.
 12. J. Jackson, "Being and becoming an Indian in the Vaupés," in G. Urban and J. Sherzer, eds., *Nation-State and Indian in Latin America*, ms.
 13. R. Wagner, *The Invention of Culture* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975), p. 28.
 14. See, E. Wolf: In the rough and tumble of social interaction, groups are known to exploit the ambiguities of inherited forms, to impart new evaluations or valences to them, to borrow forms more expressive of their interests, or to create wholly new forms to answer to changed circumstances (*op cit.* [1982], p. 387).
 15. P. Bourgois, "Conjugated oppression: Class and ethnicity among Guaymi and Kuna banana workers," *American Ethnologist* (1988), Vol. 15, No. 2, pp. 328-348; 329.
 16. L. Desprès, "Ethnicity: What data and theory portend for plural societies," in D. Maybury-Lewis, ed., *The Prospects for Plural Societies* (Washington, D.C.: American Ethnological Society, 1982), p. 10.
 17. F. Barth, *op cit.* (1969), p. 13 (emphasis added); R. Cohen, "Ethnicity: Problem and focus in anthropology," *Annual Review of Anthropology* (1978), Vol. 7, pp. 385-386.
 18. Joan Vincent, "The structuring of ethnicity," *Human Organization* (1974), Vol 33, No. 4, pp. 375-379, 377.
 19. Although authors such as J. Nagata ("What is a Malay? Situational selection of ethnic identity in a plural society," *American Ethnologist* [1974], Vol. 1, pp. 331-344), Barth (*op cit.* [1969]), and Cohen, (*op cit.* [1978], p. 387) discuss ethnicity in terms of ties of descent and blood, origin and background, a historically derived identity, an "aura of descent," they yet eventually indicate in some manner that ethnicity ultimately involves parameters of interethnic confrontation -- ideological or economic (see Bourgois *op cit.* [1988], p. 329).
 20. J. Kahn, "Explaining ethnicity: A review article," *Critique of Anthropology* (1981) Vol. 16, No. 4, pp. 43-52; 49; Bourgois, *ibid.*, p. 329.
 21. Cohen, *op cit.* (1978), p. 398.
 22. *ibid.*, pp. 385-386.
 23. Vincent, *op cit.* (1974), p. 376.
 24. J. Vincent, *African Elite: The Big Men of a Small Town* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), p. 10; See also, J. O'Brien, "Toward reconstitution of ethnicity: Capitalist expansion and cultural dynamics in Sudan," *American Anthropologist* (1986), Vol. 88, pp. 898-907; 898.
 25. Wolf, *op cit.* (1982), p. 387.
 26. Clifford comments that his analysis of the trial may be objectionable to Native Americans who do see their culture and tradition as continuities rather than

- inventions (*op cit.* [1988], p. 290); see also, S. Wermeil, "Mashpee Indians – a tribe? Key issue at tomorrow's trial," *Boston GLOBE*, Oct. 16, 1977, p. 24.
27. For an excellent example of this, see the firestorm elicited by Smith in the subsequent issues of *Cultural Survival Newsletter*. (R. Smith, "A Search for Unity Within Diversity: Peasant Unions, Ethnic Federations, and Indianist Movements in the Andean Republics," in T. Macdonald, ed., *Native Peoples and Economic Development: Six Case Studies from Latin America* (Cambridge, MA: Cultural Survival, 1985).
 28. It should be noted that the authors from whom I draw my examples of negative language are themselves disputing the negative stance of other authors who see ethnicity as trivial (Wirth, "The Problem of Minority Groups," in T. Parsons et. al., *Theories of Society* [New York: Free Press, 1961], pp. 301-305) or as a survival, as a nonrational attachment (e.g., G. Devereux, "Ethnic Identity: its logical foundations and its dysfunctions," in G. De Vos and L. Romanucci-Ross, eds., *Ethnic Identity: Cultural Continuities and Change* [Palo Alto: Mayfield, 1975], pp. 42-70; Isaacs, *Idols of the Tribe: Group Identity and Political Change* [New York: Harper and Row, 1975]), a traditional aberration in a modern world, a consequence of some deep-seated irrationality (see J. Kahn, *op cit.* [1981], p. 49), who describe ethnic confrontations in terms of political lag and false consciousness. Politicians can also criticize ethnicity as being a brake and impediment to change, nation-building, progress, etc., or as a "tribalism" associated with a colonial past (see D. Maybury-Lewis, Introduction: Alternatives to extinction," in D. Maybury-Lewis, ed., *The Prospects for Plural Societies* [Washington: American Ethnological Society, 1982]).
 29. See, A. Riding, "Truce between Colombia and rebels is unravelling," *New York Times*, Aug. 10, 1987, p. A-11.
 30. See J. Jackson, "Traducciones competitivas del evangelico en el Vaupés, Colombia," *América Indígena*, (1984), Vol. 44, No. 1, pp. 49-94.
 31. J. Santacruz, *Principios Fundamentales del Consejo Regional Indígena del Vaupés* (Comisaría del Vaupés, 1985).
 32. See, J. Jackson, "The impact of the state on small-scale societies," *Studies in Comparative International Development* (1984), Vol. 19, No. 2.
 33. J. Jackson, *op cit.* (1989).
 34. See J. Hill, "In Neca gobierno de Puebla: Mexicano penetrations of the Mexican state," in G. Urban and J. Sherzer, eds., *Nation-State and Indian in Latin America*, Ms.
 35. I am grateful to Stephen Hugh-Jones for his well-thought-out views on this topic.
 36. See, L. Belkin, "Of Indian roots, and profits as well," *New York Times*, Thursday, Sept. 29, 1988, p. A-18; E. Wade, "The ethnic art market in the American Southwest 1880-1980," in G. Stocking, ed., *Objects and Others: Essays on Museums and Material Culture* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), pp. 167-191.
 37. See, R. Keesing, "Models, 'folk' and 'cultural': paradigms regained?" in N. Quinn and D. Holland, eds., *Cultural Models in Language and Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 369-394; 388.
 38. L. Todd, *Pidgins and Creoles* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974), p. 2.
 39. *Ibid.*, p. v.
 40. K. Whinnom, "Linguistic hybridization and the 'special case' of pidgins and creoles," in D. Hymes, ed., *Pidginization and Creolization of Languages* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), pp. 91-116; 108.
 41. Todd, *op cit.* (1974), p. vi.
 42. D. DeCamp, "The development of pidgin and creole studies," in A. Valdman, ed., *Pidgin and Creole Linguistics* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977), p. 17.
 43. I am grateful to Steven Feld for this example.
 44. D. DeCamp, Introduction: The study of pidgin and creole languages," in D. Hymes, ed., *Pidginization and Creolization of Languages* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), p. 22.
 45. M. Bakhtin, M. Holquist ed., *The Dialogic Imagination: Four essays by M. M. Bakhtin* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981), p. 276.

46. Bickerton, in C. Ferguson and C. DeBose, "Simplified registers, broken language, and pidginization," in A. Valdman, ed., *Pidgin and Creole Linguistics* (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1977), p. 112.
47. Cohen, *op cit.* (1978), p. 380.
48. DeCamp, *op cit.* (1977), p. 4.
49. Todd, *op cit.* (1974), pp. v-vi.
50. E. Traugott, "Pidginization, creolization, and language change," in A. Valdman, ed., *Pidgin and Creole Linguistics* (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1977), pp. 70-98; 73.
51. L. Layne, *op cit.* (1989), pp. 24-25.
52. See, M. Herzfeld, *Anthropology Through the Looking Glass: Critical Ethnography in the Margins of Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).
53. R. Handler, *Nationalism and the politics of culture in Quebec* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988), p. 51.
54. Whinnom, *op cit.* (1971), p. 103.
55. Authors differ in discussing the tricky question of how pidgins are restricted. They clearly are less redundant than other languages, and most agree that they are "reduced in structure" (D. Hymes, "Preface," in D. Hymes, ed., *Pidginization and Creolization of Languages* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971], p. 3). But whether reduction is a kind of simplification or not is debated: ". . . it is now simpler or more complex than the standard language," (D. DeCamp, *op cit.* [1971], p. 15). Pidgins are always seen as auxiliary languages in that they are limited, suitable only for specialized and limited communication. But authors note that pidgins range from being restricted or extended. Todd states that the distinction between a pidgin and a creole is a sociological rather than a linguistic distinction (L. Todd, *op cit.* [1974], p. 4), while DeCamp states that while pidgins are clearly limited, "a creole is inferior to its corresponding language only in social status" (*op cit.* [1971], p. 16).
56. Hymes, *ibid.*, p. 3.
57. DeCamp, *op cit.* (1971), p. 27.
58. See W. Labov, *The social stratification of English in New York City* (Washington: Center for Applied Linguistics, 1966).
59. *Unidad Indígena*, "El Vaupés: Geografía," Nov., No. 17, pp. 6-6. For more comprehensive ethnographic treatments of Tukanoan society see K. Arhem, *Makuna Social Organization: A Study in Descent, Alliance and the Formation of Corporate Groups in the North-Western Amazon* (Uppsala, 1981); J. Chernela, *Hierarchy and economy among the Kotiria (Janano) Speaking Peoples of the Northwest Amazon*. Columbia University Ph.D. Dissertation, 1983, University Microfilms; I. Goldman, *The Cubeo: Indians of the Northwest Amazon* (Urbana: Illinois Studies in Anthropology No. 2, 1963); C. Hugh-Jones, *From the Milk River: Spatial and Temporal Processes in Northwest Amazonia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); J. Jackson, *op cit.* (1983); G. Reichel-Dolmatoff, *Amazonian Cosmos: The Sexual and Religious Symbolism of the Tukano Indians* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), and A. P. Sorenson, Jr., "Multilingualism in the Northwest Amazon," *American Anthropologist* (1967), Vol. 69, pp. 670-682.
60. Local descent groups do have a territory more closely associated with them but this is not clearly demarcated either.
61. See, J. Fabian, *Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes its Object* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983).
62. L. Stephen, "Culture as a resource: four cases of self-managed indigenous craft production." Paper read at LASA annual meetings, New Orleans, 1988; Belkin, *op cit.* (1988); C. Hendrickson, "Images of the Indian in Guatemala: The role of indigenous dress in Indian and Ladino constructions," in G. Urban and J. Sherzer, eds., *Nation-State and Indian in Latin America*, ms.
63. Handler, *op cit.* (1988), p. 51.
64. C. Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures* (New York: Basic, 1973), p. 5; S. Mattingly, "Story and Experience in Clinical Practice," Ph.D. Dissertation, M.I.T., 1989.
65. Cf. J. Friedlaender, *Being Indian in Hueyapan: A Study of Forced Identity in Contemporary Mexico* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1975); Hill, *op cit.*
66. Layne, *op cit.* (1988).

67. W. Kelly, "Rationalization and nostalgia: Cultural dynamics of new middle-class Japan," *American Ethnologist* (1986), Vol 13, No. 14, pp. 603-618.
68. See, Hymes, *op cit.* (1971), p. 3; "When I myself began studying Jamaican creole in 1957, I received from a colleague a similar warning that I should avoid such quasi-languages and should work on an American Indian or other "real" language. And a number of other contemporary linguists . . . have found in pidgins and creoles ammunition against the rigid structuralism of Saussurean and Chomskian theories," (De Camp, *op cit.* [1977], p. 17).
69. R. Handler, "On having a culture: Nationalism and the preservation of Quebec's patrimoine," in G. Stocking, ed., *Objects and Others: Essays on Museums and Material Culture* (Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), pp. 192-217; B. Jules-Rosette, *The Messages of Tourist Art* (New York: Plenum, 1984); V. Dominguez, "The marketing of heritage," *American Ethnologist* (1986), Vol. 13, No. 3, pp. 546-555.